A few brief thoughts in response to this interesting post on the Dobbs case by my esteemed colleague Steve Sachs. (I say nothing about Steve’s broader body of work, apart from the post). Steve writes that a failure to overturn Roe v. Wade would be an “extraordinary black mark for the conservative legal movement,” but would in no way damage originalism as such. After all, “[p]eople can call themselves ‘originalists’ and still be wrong about the original Constitution, just as they can call themselves ‘historians’ and still be wrong about history.” On Steve’s view, cited in the post, originalism is a standard that defines the rightness of right answers, not a decision procedure, let alone a foolproof decision procedure, for identifying those answers. It follows that originalism is untouched by any given misapplication of the standard, or even a long series of misapplications. “What kind of views of the Constitution do you hold, if you’d go look for new ones based on what some robe-wearing politician-approved bureaucrats say?… If you think originalism requires overturning Roe, and if it turns out that the Court’s self-described originalists still won’t do it, why conclude that originalism is lousy, and not that the Justices you’re mad at are lousy originalists?”
Even the committed originalist might start to have doubts, however, about a standard that is applied incorrectly even on a question, the validity of Roe v. Wade, that conservative originalists have repeatedly described as surpassingly easy—and what’s worse applied incorrectly by the very jurists who have been handpicked by the conservative legal movement, over a number of years, with an eye to fidelity to originalism and to their stellar credentials. If the crème de la crème of the conservative legal movement are “lousy originalists,” who exactly can use the method properly, and who exactly should be sitting on the bench? A standard that provides unreliable guidance even to those trained for a professional lifetime in its use might justly be suspected of being so vacuous, or manipulable, or simply so far out of accord with the true nature of the subject matter, as to amount to no standard at all. We have no trouble with this point in other walks of life. If someone said that all actually existing accountants were lousy at applying accounting standards, we might well start to suspect that either the speaker had a poor theory of what the standards require, or that the standards themselves are not fulfilling their role as standards. When Justice Gorsuch wrote the explicitly originalist opinion for the Court in Bostock, a number of originalist critics tried to defend the theory by condemning the man, saying that Gorsuch had simply done originalism wrong. But if a Marshall Scholar and John Finnis student who wrote a whole book on originalism can’t do it right, it’s time to start wondering whether the fault lies in the theory.
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