Monday, July 3, 2023

The Rogue Court vs Modern Democracy - by Thomas Zimmer



The Rogue Court vs Modern Democracy - by Thomas Zimmer

The Rogue Court vs Modern Democracy

America can accept this Supreme Court as legitimate and its rulings as the final word - or it can have true democracy and a functioning state. But not both.

It was a disastrous week for all those who would prefer to live in a multiracial, pluralistic democracy with a functional government able to handle the challenges of modern life.

After some better-than-expected rulings that reignited talk of a “moderate” conservative Court exercising restraint, the reactionary majority left the worst for last. The Supreme Court ended its term with a flurry of decisions that thoroughly undermine the drive towards egalitarian democracy and the ability of the state to tackle the most urgent collective actions problems of the twenty-first century.

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The (stupid) legend of the 3-3-3 Court

It’s worth reflecting a little bit on the trajectory of this 6-3 Court. Two years ago, it ended the 2021 term – the first in the current constellation with six rightwing judges, after Amy Coney Barrett had succeeded Ruth Bader Ginsburg in October 2020 – with noticeable restraint: no earth-shaking decisions, no attempts to unravel the “liberal” status quo. Had the fear of the new conservative supermajority on the High Court been overblown?

For most serious observers, the obvious explanation for how the Court conducted itself in 2021 was that the rightwing majority, faced with a riled-up public, acted cautiously for tactical reasons. Remember that the 6-3 constellation was the result of several questionable – to use a wonderfully euphemistic term – actions by Republicans. After the death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg in September 2020, Republicans insisted on putting Amy Coney Barrett on the Court in record time – even though there were less than 40 days between her nomination and the presidential election in early November. This was a remarkable move, considering that Republicans had refused to even hold hearings for Merrick Garland, who president Obama had nominated in March 2016 to succeed Antonin Scalia. Such a far-reaching decision, Mitch McConnell – ever the tribune of the people! – argued at the time, should not be made in an election year and should instead be left to the next president. After blocking the process for almost a year, Republicans ultimately got Trump to the White House, who immediately nominated Neil Gorsuch. But two years later, in the fall of 2020, Republicans were entirely comfortable to ignore their own bad-faith rational for why they sabotaged Barrack Obama’s pick. It must be considered the least surprising development in recent political history In-between Gorsuch and Coney Barrett, they had already insisted on placing Brett Kavanaugh on the Court in 2018: a man credibly accused of sexual assault, which only strengthened the resolve of Republican lawmakers – upstanding Christian patriots and defenders of family values, all of them – to close ranks behind him.

Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett – all three of them hand-picked by the Federalist Society, of course, to insure their impeccable “conservative” credentials, meaning they are reactionaries who can be relied upon to drag the Court significantly to the Right. All three nominated by a president who had lost the popular vote – and after January 6, 2021, by a president who had attempted a self-coup that would have ended democracy and constitutional government in the United States.

So stark, so crass, so bizarre was the discrepancy between the pretensions of democracy and the reality of minority dominance, between the norms of the political process and a reality in which Republicans displayed zero interest in forbearance, between the ideal of nonpartisanship the Court always claims for itself and the reality of a brutal rightwing power grab, that for a while, even the Democratic establishment seemed to agree that something had to change. Court reform, expanding the Court, restricting judicial review… the contours of what, exactly, should be done remained fuzzy. But it was enough to put some pressure on the Court’s conservative majority: A credible threat – and a big part of why the 2021 term ended in restraint. The Right had decided it was better to keep a low profile, avoid attracting more criticism, let the storm pass.

And it totally worked. As the full-on assault on fundamental rights and democracy failed to materialize in 2021, mainstream Court coverage quickly reverted back to its idolizing mean and enthusiastically told the people about the most wondrous, most marvelous of creatures: the 3-3-3 Court. A rightwing supermajority? No! Three “conservatives” (Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch) on the right, three “liberals” (Sotomayor, Kagan, Breyer) on the left – and the most revered figure in American mainstream imagination, the “moderate institutionalist” represented three times (Roberts, Barrett, and Kavanaugh) in the middle. The mythical center was holding after all. It never made any sense, beyond the most superficial layer of pseudo-analysis. 

But there is a professional machine of Court observers always ready to propagate the legend of the noble, nonpartisan Court, all balls and strikes. The “3-3-3 Court” narrative embodied all the pathologies of the hagiographic mainstream Supreme Court discourse, propelled by journalists whose professional standing depends on access as much as it does on the reputation of the institution which they are supposedly tasked to cover critically, and by legal experts who often have a vested interest not just in making their profession look good in general, but also in building rather than burning bridges to the all-powerful justices on the nation’s highest court.

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Sunday, July 2, 2023

Akbar: - Non-Reformist Reforms and Struggles over Life, Death, and Democracy- Yale Law Journal

Yale Law Journal - Non-Reformist Reforms and Struggles over Life, Death, and Democracy

ABSTRACT. Today’s left social movements are challenging formal law and politics for their capitulation to a regime of racial capitalism. In this Feature, I argue that we must reconceive our relationship to reform and the popular struggles in which they are embedded. I examine the turn of left social movements to “non-reformist reforms” as a framework for reconceiving reform: not as an end goal but as struggles to reconstitute the terms of life, death, and democracy. Non-reformist reforms aim to undermine the prevailing political, economic, social order, construct an essentially different one, and build democratic power toward emancipatory horizons. Today’s thinking about non-reformist reform is both an effort to rethink the kinds of laws, policies, norms, relationships, and modes of organization that we might build to govern society, and an effort to democratize relations of power: to have fundamentally different people at the helm.

Part I identifies the return of a commonsense on the left that racism and capitalism are entangled and co-constitutive of the unequal and undemocratic world. Part II lays out left critiques of reformism and offers a schematic history for “non-reformist reforms” as a competing conceptual frame to the neoliberal or liberal reformism dominant in the legal academy. In centering productive contradictions between reform and revolution, the heuristic requires engaging with systems as they are, allows one to hold in view bold and radical horizons, and facilitates the identification of strategic battles that might serve as a bridge through popular agitation.

Because non-reformist reforms emerge from theories of change rooted in building popular power, Part III attends to actually existing sites of struggle in the United States: abolition and decriminalization; decolonization and decommodification; and democratization. I turn to major campaigns, including #StopCopCity in Atlanta; organizing to cancel rent by KC Tenants in Kansas City, Missouri, and to cancel student debt by the Debt Collective; and the Democratic Socialists of America’s (DSA) joint campaign for the Protect the Right to Organize (PRO) Act and the Green New Deal.

Part IV turns to the disciplinary reorientations required for engaging law as a partial terrain of mass politics. I outline four fundamental distinctions between non-reformist reforms and liberal and neoliberal approaches to reform. Non-reformist reforms require a horizon beyond legalism; they embrace antagonism and conflict rather than depoliticization and neutrality; they aim to shift the balance of power; and they build mass organization and prepare the people to govern.

AUTHOR. Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. 

Student loans unforgiven: so much for textualism: Nebraska v. Biden

 Student loans unforgiven: so much for textualism: Nebraska v. Biden

Last year, the Secretary of Education established the first comprehensive student loan forgiveness program, invoking the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) for authority to do so. The Secretary’s plan canceled roughly $430 billion of federal student loan balances, completely erasing the debts of 20 million borrowers and lowering the median amount owed by the other 23 million from $29,40 0to $13,600. See ibid.; App. 243. Six States sued, arguing that the HEROES Act does not authorize the loan cancellation plan. We agree."
C.J. John Roberts for the 6-3 majority in Biden v. Nebraska - the "student loan forgiveness case"

One might  think that a court faced with a challenge to the Secretary of Education's student loan forgiveness program would celebrate it as a welcome effort to provide relief for debt-burdened youth after the financial and emotional traumas of the Covid 19 pandemic that took nearly one million lives.  But NO. Not this Court, not the conservative supermajority who would depart from their usually boldly asserted textualism and find that the so-called HEROES Act did not provide support for the President to whom the Secretary of Education responds.  The statute provides that the Secretary 

 “may waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs under title IV of the [Education Act] as the Secretary deems necessary in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency.” 20 U. S. C. §1098bb(a)(1)

One can read the entire literature on the law of causal relationship and not find broader language than "in connection with...a national emergency". But the right wing governors of Nebraska and Missouri, among others, asserted that their states were harmed by a measure that provided substantial relief to their citizens.  Some - like conservative professor William Baude  as amicus found the states to have suffered no real injury - therefore lacking standing.   But the usual suspects - the right wing think tanks were joined by establishment conservatives opposed the measure, like former Circuit  Judge Michael W. McConnell  and [recently deceasedBush 43 White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray  joined the conservative  hue and cry .  

The McConnell brief - argued as amici that spending laws must be narrowly construed.  Even one liberal law professor Jed Shugerman, agreed that the measure was unlawful.  Shugerman in an article in The Atlantic and in a later amicus brief found the relationship between the pandemic emergency and the debt  relief plan to be "pretextual" - not a faithful execution of the laws. He offered  an alternative route - the Higher Education act of 1965.  The six conservative justices predictably did not take that bait.  Biden will likely try that route now.

But the deeper criticism of the court here is that for all its purported textualism, the text doesn't count for much when the text doesn't play well to the celebrants of the "unitary executive" when the executive is a Democrat.  The traditional judicial virtues such as deference to the presumed good faith  of  Presidential action can be set aside by the newly minted judicial aggrandizement dubbed by the six Republican justices as the "Major Questions doctrine".  For that the justices demand not a President's good faith and  textual support but a "clear" delegation of authority by Congress.  The  unelected justices should, instead, demand of themselves clear textual authority before daring to set aside actions of the elected branches.

Some are quick to rebut that assertion - pointing to the activism of the Warren Court of the 1950s and 1960s.  But the two judicial thrusts are falsely equated.  The Warren Court was grounded in the century of state laws undercutting the post-Civil War Amendments abolishing slavery, promising equal protection, and the right to vote. This majority is rooted in its opposition to the modernization of the national government which began via the post Civil War Amendments and then again with the progressives, and most contentiously now Franklin D. Roosevelt's program to bring the nation out of the 1929 depression.

-  George Conk July 2, 2023

Baumann: Let's Talk about Barrett' on the " Major Questions Doctrine/"/Yale Journal on Regulation


 

Baumann: Let's Talk about Barrett's concurence and the "contextual" Major Questions Doctrine //Yale Journal on Regulation

By Beau Baumann

As many of you know, the Supreme Court just shot down the student-loan forgiveness plan in Biden v. Nebraska. The majority opinion written by John Roberts predictably held that the HEROES Act does not empower the Secretary of Education to cancel loans on the scale envisioned by the Biden Administration. In a separate subsection (see pgs. 19–25 of the slip op.), Roberts bats away the Biden Administration’s arguments about the capaciousness of the HEROES Act and its nature as an emergency statute with the major questions doctrine (“MQD”). That portion of the majority opinion is fairly straightforward. The Government’s distinction between regulation and government benefits failed—the MQD applies to both forms of agency actions. Not too many surprises.

The more interesting development is Amy Coney Barrett’s concurrence. In a move that many admin scholars will appreciate, myself included, Barrett suggests that the MQD is probably indefensible as a substantive canon. She wrote that she “take[s] seriously the charge that the doctrine is inconsistent with textualism.” And she granted “that some articulations of the [MQD] on offer—most notably, that the doctrine is a substantive canon—should give a textualist pause.” [*pause for claps*] But any glee in the hearts of the MQD’s critics spoils pretty quickly from there.

Barrett pivots to context in a move that mirrors Ilan Wurman’s work (channeling Ryan Doerfler) on the MQD. By context, she means that there are basically two things supporting the MQD. One is a descriptive claim about how Congress operates; it doesn’t use underdetermined and ancillary statutory text to greenlight agency actions of political or economic significance. We’ll call that the MQD’s descriptive claim. Second, you have a theory of language. Ryan has written about this; it’s basically the idea that we would expect principals to speak clearly if they were telling their agents to do something big. In a nutshell, it’s the empirical claim that folks don’t empower their agents to do some high-stakes without speaking clearly. Barrett illustrates this herself with an example: 

Consider a parent who hires a babysitter to watch her young children over the weekend. As she walks out the door, the parent hands the babysitter her credit card and says: “Make sure the kids have fun.” Emboldened, the babysitter takes the kids on a road trip to an amusement park, where they spend two days on rollercoasters and one night in a hotel. Was the babysitter’s trip consistent with the parent’s instruction?

Barrett’s move here seems big because it she is offering them a story about the MQD that’s designed to sit more comfortably with textualism. I would not be surprised if this were the future of the MQD. That’s a bold prediction—after all, none of Barrett’s colleagues joined her opinion. But as someone who spends an unhealth amount of time thinking about and absorbing MQD content, something has to give. The contradictions with textualism are too apparent. And the charges that we’re living through a “judicial power grab” basically write themselves. 

That’s not to say that this context-based rebrand does much better. As I’ve described elsewhere, the contextual MQD suffers from a host of issues. The MQD’s descriptive claim is wrong. As lawyers, we have all come upon examples of Congress’s propensity to do “major” things through underdetermined statutory provisions. A word we use to describe some such statutes is “superstatutes.” But we can describe entire fields—like my own, immigration—as being shot through with counterexamples. While Barrett cites some evidence of drafters’ intent, it’s all evidence that many who read this blog know doesn’t actually support the MQD. See, e.g.Walters at 56. Really, the MQD is a fiction about legislative intent like Chevron’s old fiction. Fictions pervade the public law canon—there’s nothing inherently wrong with them. But the first rule of fictions is you don’t forget that they’re not real. They have to have second-order justifications. As a result, the descriptive case isn’t “context,” it’s just judicial policymaking under another label.

The language-based understanding of the MQD does no better. No one has actually tested the empirical claim that undergirds this understanding of the MQD. As I told Richard Re recently, I understand that courts have long used dubious descriptive empirical claims to back their reasoning. But we also used to burn witches. I think we can probably aspire to more. Word on the street is that people are working on empirically testing this claim now—keep an eye on this space. More importantly, even if the empirical claim is accurate, it doesn’t always support the MQD. That was Ryan’s key insight. Ryan thought that the linguistic insight he was writing about cut against both of Congress’s agents, both courts and agencies. Agencies should pause before doing something major. But the same goes for courts. We could reframe the question from the vaccine-or-test case as follows: should federal judges strike down an agency action if it poses significant consequences (e.g., the death of thousands of people). The upshot of Doerfler’s work is that judges should not strike down agency actions if they will be causing tremendous consequences—like, you know, exacerbating the devastation caused by a once-in-a-century pandemic. This linguistic insight supports Thayerian deference as much as it supports the MQD. 

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303 Creative - Sotomayor dissents in favor of Same Sex marriage partners

 

2303 CREATIVE LLCv.ELENIS  

SOTOMAYOR,J., dissenting

“What a difference five years makes.”Carsonv.Makin,596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slipop., at 5). 

Today is a sad day in American constitutional law and inthe lives of LGBT people. The Supreme Court of the United States declares that a particular kind of business, though open to the public, has a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of a protected class. The Court does so for the first time in its history. By issuing this new license todiscriminate in a case brought by a company that seeks todeny same-sex couples the full and equal enjoyment of its services, the immediate, symbolic effect of the decision is to mark gays and lesbians for second-class status. In this way,the decision itself inflicts a kind of stigmatic harm, on top of any harm caused by denials of service. The opinion of thenCourt is, quite literally, a notice that reads: “Some services may be denied to same-sex couples.”


And not just at the Court. Around the country,there has been a backlash to the movement for liberty and equality for gender and sexualminorities. New forms of inclusion have been met with reactionary exclusion.Thisis heartbreaking. Sadly, it is also familiar. When the civilrights and women’s rights movements sought equality inpublic life, some public establishments refused. Some evenclaimed, based on sincere religious beliefs, constitutionalrights to discriminate. The brave Justices who once sat onthis Court decisively rejected those claims.Now the Court faces a similar test. A business open tothe public seeks to deny gay and lesbian customers the fulland equal enjoyment of its services based on the owner’sreligious belief that same-sex marriages are “false.”

 Thebusiness argues, and a majority of the Court agrees, thatbecause the business offers services that are customizedand expressive, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-ment shields the business from a generally applicable lawthat prohibits discrimination in the sale of publicly availa-ble goods and services. That iswrong. Profoundly wrong.As I will explain, the law in question targets conduct, notspeech, for regulation, and theactof discrimination hasnever constituted protectedexpression under the FirstAmendment. Our Constitutioncontains

Saturday, July 1, 2023

Winters: A First Amendment Exception to the death of affirmative action| National Catholic Reporter

"Taking the two decisions together, an interesting thought emerges: How would the conservative majority rule if a religious college argued that affirmative action was part of its creed? That would produce some interesting arguments."
Will Supreme Court decision achieve 'colorblindness for all'? | National Catholic Reporter
By Michael Sean Winters

Two Supreme Court decisions on June 29 had special significance for those concerned about the intersection of law and religion, and the results couldn't have been more different.

In the first case, Groff v. DeJoy, an evangelical Christian sued the postmaster general because he was told he must work on Sundays. The court, in a unanimous decision — that's right, a unanimous decision — sided with the employee. Writing for the court, Justice Samiel Alito said, "an employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business."

It had been 50 years since the court had actually looked at what standard should apply to flesh out the kind of accommodations Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires, and a lot of regulations had been passed since. The fact that the decision was unanimous is a big, flashing light to those who think they can override the religion clauses of the First Amendment for any but the most extreme reasons.

The second decision was more controversial, and more contested. It addressed two challenges to the affirmative action policies at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina brought by an advocacy organization, Students for Fair Admissions.  

Jerome Karabel| This Moment Is the Culmination of a Decades-Long Backlash Against Affirmative Action - The New York Times

Opinion | This Moment Is the Culmination of a Decades-Long Backlash Against Affirmative Action - The New York Times
By Jerome Karabel[Emeritus Professor of sociaology, UC Berkeley; Author of The Chosen]: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale and Princeton.”

In a historic commencement address at Howard University on June 4, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson laid out the intellectual and moral basis for affirmative action. Speaking less than a year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and two months before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, he invoked a metaphor that remains resonant nearly 60 years later: “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.”

Heeding Johnson’s call and responding to the demands of the civil rights movement for racial justice, many selective colleges and universities altered their admissions policies with the express intent of increasing the number of Black students. The need for change was undeniable: As late as 1960, just 15 students (0.5 percent) of the combined entering classes at Harvard, Yale and Princeton were Black. At the U.C.L.A. School of Medicine, which, like other University of California institutions, followed an official policy of colorblindness, not a single Black person was among the 764 students who received M.D.s from 1955 to 1968. Among people in the legal profession as a whole, including graduates of the five historically Black law schools, fewer than 1 percent were Black in 1968. Affirmative action offered a way to take into account far-reaching differences in personal circumstances and to begin to right a historic wrong.

After a brief honeymoon of public support, affirmative action was met with a powerful backlash, and the policy has been under attack ever since. Decades of lawsuits and legislation have chipped away at the use of racial preferences. And now, in a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court has consigned them to the grave.

The intensity and duration of the attack are sad confirmation that many Americans remain unwilling to reckon with the barbarity of our racial history. Every period of progress for Black people has been met with a racial backlash. In response to Reconstruction, Southern white people developed an entirely new and mythical history of slavery, the Civil War and ultimately Reconstruction. More than a century later, this insistence on denying history lives on. Witness the laws in a growing number of conservative states that prohibit teaching the truth about racial oppression, with dismissal and possibly even jail for teachers who dare to defy them.

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It's only gays I refuse to photograph because God.... 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (06/30/2023)

21-476 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (06/30/2023)
from the Syllabus:
303 CREATIVE LLC ET AL. v. ELENIS ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT No. 21–476. Argued December 5, 2022—Decided June 30, 2023 
Lorie Smith wants to expand her graphic design business, 303 Creative LLC, to include services for couples seeking wedding websites. But Ms. Smith worries that Colorado will use the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act to compel her—in violation of the First Amendment—to create websites celebrating marriages she does not endorse. To clarify her rights, Ms. Smith filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to prevent the State from forcing her to create websites celebrating marriages that defy her belief that marriage should be reserved to unions between one man and one woman. CADA prohibits all “public accommodations” from denying “the full and equal enjoyment” of its goods and services to any customer based on his race, creed, disability, sexual orientation, or other statutorily enumerated trait. Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a). 
The law defines “public accommodation” broadly to include almost every public-facing business in the State. §24–34–601(1). Either state officials or private citizens may bring actions to enforce the law. §§24–34–306, 24–34– 602(1). And a variety of penalties can follow any violation. Before the district court, Ms. Smith and the State stipulated to a number of facts: Ms. Smith is “willing to work with all people regardless of classifications such as race, creed, sexual orientation, and gender” and “will gladly create custom graphics and websites” for clients of any sexual orientation; she will not produce content that “contradicts biblical truth” regardless of who orders it; Ms. Smith’s belief that marriage is a union between one man and one woman is a sincerely held conviction; Ms. Smith provides design services that are “expressive” and her “original, customized” creations “contribut[e] to the overall message” her business conveys “through the websites” it creates; the wedding websites she plans to create “will be expressive in nature,” 

A jury of one's peers? Not in Mississippi - Sotomayor dissents in Clark v. Mississippi (06/30/2023)

Mississippi Goddamn, as Nina Simone sang.  Another day another disgraceful decision.  The Supreme Court has allowed a conviction in a capital case to stand despite powerful evidence that the jury was not  composed of Terrell Clark's African American peers. - GWC
22-6057 Clark v. Mississippi (06/30/2023)
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. Just a few years ago, this Court took an admirable stand to defend its landmark decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). Batson plays a vital role in preserving the integrity of our judicial system by ensuring that people are not prevented from serving as jurors because of their race. Yet not all courts were heeding Batson’s command. In particular, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected evidence that a juror was struck based on his race in a death penalty case, where the stakes could not have been higher. In reversing that decision, this Court emphasized the importance of “vigorously enforc[ing] and reinforc[ing]” Batson and the need to “guar[d] against any backsliding.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 16). That decision was a powerful articulation of the equal protection principles that Batson vindicates. 
***
After the State had used all of its peremptory strikes, however, “[t]he jury ultimately consisted of eleven white jurors, one black juror, and two white alternate jurors.” Ibid. Black jurors had thus dwindled down to 7 percent. To get there, at the peremptory strike stage, the State struck seven out of the eight remaining Black prospective jurors, or “87.5 percent of the black jurors it encountered and only 16.7 percent of the white jurors.” Ibid. In other words, the State was over five times more likely to strike a Black prospective juror than a white one. These are the kinds of numbers that in the past this Court has found to be evidence of discrimination. For example, the Court found there was statistical evidence of discrimination when an initial venire panel was 18.5 percent Black, the peremptory strike rate of eligible Black venire members was 91 percent, and only one Black juror ended up on the jury. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 240– 241 (2005). 
These numbers are quite similar to those here. 

Sotomayor dissenting: `Qualified immunity' is an Escherian Stairwell - Lombardo v. St. Louis (06/30/2023)

Fox 2

An Escherian Stairwell

The Supreme Court has designed a rule: cases against police go nowhere.
Lombardo v. St. Louis (06/30/2023)22-510
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE JACKSON would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

 “It hurts. Stop.” These were the words of Nicholas Gilbert just before he died at the hands of St. Louis police officers. Lombardo v. St. Louis, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per curiam)   The police arrested Gilbert for trespassing and for failing to show up in court for a traffic ticket. They took him into custody. Six hours later, Gilbert was dead. 
The facts, taken in the light required at this stage of litigation, show that six officers in a small holding cell held Gilbert face down on the ground in handcuffs and leg irons while at least one officer pressed down on his back for 15 minutes—that is, until Gilbert stopped breathing. Gilbert’s parents sued. They argued that the police used excessive force against their son, in violation of the United States Constitution. The parents demanded a jury trial. 
The courts below, however, decided that a trial was unnecessary because qualified immunity shielded the officers. A Federal District Court concluded that the officers did not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of Gilbert’s death. Lombardo v. Saint Louis City, 361 F. Supp. 3d 882, 895 (ED Mo. 2019). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit went a step further, deciding that the officers did not violate any constitutional right at all. 956 F. 3d 1009, 1014 (2020). 
***
The “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis can pose a very high bar for plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their rights. Even when government officials violate the law, qualified immunity shields them from damages liability unless the “the violative nature of [the] particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). When taken too far, as here, this requirement allows lower courts to split hairs in distinguishing facts or otherwise defining clearly established law at a low level of generality, which impairs the ability of constitutional torts to deter and remedy official misconduct. See, e.g., J. Jeffries, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va. L. Rev. 207, 256 (2013) (“It is as if the one-bite rule for bad dogs started over with every change in weather conditions”).  

Making matters worse, a court may grant qualified immunity based on the clearly established prong without ever resolving the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. This inhibits the development of the law. “Important constitutional questions go unanswered precisely because those questions are yet unanswered. Courts then rely on that judicial silence to conclude there’s no equivalent case on the books.” Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F. 3d 483, 499 (CA5 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante). If this Court is going to endorse this “Escherian Stairwell,” ibid., then it should instead reexamine the doctrine of qualified immunity and the assumptions underlying it. The doctrine is a creation of our own design. The Constitution’s command is clear: Police officers may not use deadly force unless they reasonably believe that a suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious injury to the officers or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 3 (1985). We must give officers leeway to use judgment in close situations, but not so much leeway that we nullify the Constitution’s protections or permit officers to escape scrutiny by juries. 


In a Missed “Opportunity To Learn From Its Mistakes,” Supreme Court Leaves Mississippi’s Felony Disenfranchisement Provision in Place - Democracy Docket

Scotus:  Harness v. Watson, June 30, 2023
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. The President of the 1890 Mississippi Constitutional Convention said it plain: “Let us tell the truth if it bursts the bottom of the Universe . . . We came here to exclude the negro. Nothing short of this will answer.”1 To further that agenda, the Convention placed nine crimes in §241 of the State’s Constitution as bases for disenfranchisement, believing that more Black people would be convicted of those crimes than White people. See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 222–223 (1898) (acknowledging that purpose, but expressing “no concern” regarding the Conventioneers’ objective); Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 265, 20 So. 865, 868 (1896) (similar); 47 F. 4th 296, 300 (CA5 2022) (per curiam) (en banc) (case below) (recognizing §241’s discriminatory aim).


In Harness v. Watson the United  States Supreme Court once more stood by as Mississippi disenfranchised Black voters.The story of this new miscarriage of justice is well told here. But I feel compelled to mention an article by a mentor of mine, the late co-founder of the Center for Constitutional Rights Morton Stavis: A Century of Struggle for Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi: From the Civil War to the Congressional Challenge of 1965—And Beyond, 57 Miss. L.J. 591(1987) 

- GWC

In a Missed “Opportunity To Learn From Its Mistakes,” Supreme Court Leaves Mississippi’s Felony Disenfranchisement Provision in Place - Democracy Docket


On Friday, June 30, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to weigh in on a lawsuit challenging Mississippi’s strict felony disenfranchisement provision (Section 241) that was enshrined in the state’s 1890 constitution. The heart of the appeal to the Supreme Court centered around the following questions: What does it take to rectify a policy that was rooted in the scourge of Jim Crow-era racial discrimination? The passage of time? Updates in language? And when are those tweaks not enough?

Previously, in August 2022, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Section 241. As a result of the Supreme Court’s refusal to review the 5th Circuit’s decision, the invidious felony disenfranchisement provision remains on the books and will continue to disenfranchise tens of thousands of Mississippians. According to the Sentencing Project, Mississippi disenfranchises nearly 11% of its voting age population, the highest percentage in the country.

Mississippi’s 1890 felony disenfranchisement provision was enacted with blatantly discriminatory intent.

When Mississippi called a constitutional convention in 1890, the president of the convention exclaimed: “We came here to exclude the Negro. Nothing short of this will answer.” That goal included drafting Section 241, a segment of the new constitution that codified felony disenfranchisement in the state. 

Section 241 outlined nine crimes that would disqualify voters for life: bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement and bigamy. The delegates designed this list to include crimes that they believed Black people were more likely to commit while excluding the “crimes of the whites.” 

Since 1890, there have been two minor updates to the language in Section 241, though the bulk of the original list of disenfranchising crimes remains intact. In 1950, Mississippi’s all-white Legislature and electorate removed burglary from the list of disenfranchising crimes. Then, in 1968, the Legislature added rape and murder to the list through the same constitutional amendment process.

Individuals convicted of one of Section 241’s disqualifying crimes can only regain voting rights through what is essentially an individualized piece of legislation that must pass both chambers of the Legislature by a two-thirds vote and be signed by the governor. In the 2023 legislative session, the Mississippi Legislature did not restore voting rights to a single person.

In 2017, individuals with prior felony convictions filed a lawsuit challenging Section 241.

A legal challenge to Section 241 emerged in 2017 when the Mississippi Center for Justice filed a lawsuit — Harness v. Watson — on behalf of Roy Harness and Kamal Karriem, two Black Mississippians who are barred for life from voting because of past convictions for embezzlement and forgery, respectively. 

The case argued that a 1998 lawsuit, Cotton v. Fordice, was wrongly decided. In Cotton, two incarcerated men challenged Section 241 for violating the 14th Amendment because of its indisputably racist origins. At the time, the 5th Circuit held that updates in the 1950s and 1960s to Section 241 “superseded the previous provision and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the original version.”

Harness and Karriem, the plaintiffs in the 2017 lawsuit, alleged that the record relied on by the 5th Circuit in Cotton was underdeveloped, especially considering the incarcerated plaintiffs in Cotton represented themselves without a lawyer. Nonetheless, in 2019, a federal district court ruled that Cotton was correctly decided, rejecting the claim that a more developed historical record would prove otherwise. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the 5th Circuit.

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George Conway on Twitter: "Also a point you liberals might want to consider before you reflexively condemn 303 in hysterical terms: Think of the potential lawsuits it could support against speech-inhibiting regulatory actions you might not like that, say, a DeSantis administration (state or federal) might…" / Twitter

(1) George Conway on Twitter: "Also a point you liberals might want to consider before you reflexively condemn 303 in hysterical terms: Think of the potential lawsuits it could support against speech-inhibiting regulatory actions you might not like that, say, a DeSantis administration (state or federal) might…" / Twitter

George Conway @gtconway3d Also a point you liberals might want to consider before you reflexively condemn 303 in hysterical terms: Think of the potential lawsuits it could support against speech-inhibiting regulatory actions you might not like that, say, a DeSantis administration (state or federal) might pursue. Last edited 12:59 AM · Jul 1, 2023 from Ventnor City, NJ· 338.6K Views