Friday, March 17, 2023
The Supreme Court Conservatives’ Favorite New Weapon for Kneecapping the Administrative State | The New Republic
Thursday, March 16, 2023
The Evolving Mission of Peking University's School of Transnational Law by Philip McConnaughay :: SSRN
Philip McConnaughay
Peking University School of Transnational Law
Date Written: February 21, 2023
Abstract
Peking University’s School of Transnational Law (“STL”), by most measures, has been an unqualified success. STL’s American law J.D. program – China’s only American law J.D. – is comparable in all substantial respects to the J.D. programs of leading U.S. law schools. STL’s China law Juris Master’s degree – with which STL’s J.D. is offered jointly – is reshaping the content and objectives of Chinese legal education and influencing legal education nationally. The value that students derive from the combination of STL’s J.D. and J.M. curriculums exceeds the value of studying each independently of the other.
Demand for admission to STL among China’s most academically gifted college graduates is extremely high. STL has recruited a multinational faculty of leading scholars, all of whom subscribe to the case study method of instruction with intensely interactive class sessions, including within STL’s largely civil law J.M. curriculum. The professional placement of STL graduates in world-leading Chinese and multinational law firms, businesses, government offices, and universities is exceptional, even during the recent economic downturn resulting from the pandemic. STL enjoys a steadily growing alumni base on the cusp of leadership in China and elsewhere. And STL provides all of this to students at very low cost, with an annual tuition not even 25 percent of that at most leading U.S. law schools.
Yet, because STL is an academic unit of a leading Chinese research university rather than a campus of an American university operating by special dispensation in China, STL is fully subject to Peking University and China Ministry of Education/central government regulations, policies, and practices. As a result, STL faces certain endemic challenges capable of jeopardizing its unique program and achievements. These include censorship, constraints on faculty governance, the absence of well-established standards for the profession of law, and the lingering effects of a “Zero Covid” policy that effectively deprived STL for three years of the international engagement on which its program largely depends.
This article examines these challenges, how STL contends with each, the prognosis for STL maintaining its academic independence and excellence, and STL’s evolution from an American law program in China into perhaps the world’s only true School of Transnational Law. Today, STL’s program blends the study of China law, U.S. law, and other legal regimes in ways designed to equip students for the practice of law in a world in which parties from different nations and legal traditions – including exclusively non-Western traditions – increasingly interact.
Keywords: China, legal education, Zero Covid, censorship, faculty governance, legal profession, non-Western, Juris Master's, Peking University
JEL Classification: K33, K40
Suggested Citation:
The Owl of Minerva and “Our Law” – Ius & Iustitium
Conor Casey & Adrian Vermeule[1]
On 28th February, William Baude of the University of Chicago Law School delivered the annual Scalia Lecture at Harvard Law School,[2] titled “Beyond Textualism?”—with startling results. Startling but also welcome, as we will explain.
The main question posed by Baude at the outset of his lecture is whether textualism is “missing something important”? Baude began in a conventional register by suggesting that textualism is said to reflect the “basic insight central to the structure of our government…and fabric of our law” that the job of the interpreter is (a) usually to enforce rules that have been made some place else, not to make the rules herself; and (b) not to imagine decisions that were actually never made by the legislature. In general, says Baude, the results of the “textualist revolution” have been “salutary” for embedding these ideas into legal practice and thought.
The talk, however, then took a sharp and surprising turn—indeed a turn towards the very approach to legal interpretation, the classical approach, that Ius et Iustitium was founded to advocate. Baude’s answer to the question posed at the start of his lecture turned out to be an emphatic yes. Textualism is grievously incomplete, Baude now argues, chiefly because it fails adequately to take account of other sources of law, including “unwritten background principles” and “natural law.” (Yes, everything in quotation marks is a quote from the lecture). Continue reading “The Owl of Minerva and “Our Law””→
Baude concludes by warning that denying the centrality of unwritten law to American legal practice has the risk of “sending us in statutory interpretation circles, unable to explain how we can avoid being literalists…and opportunists.” If students are not exposed to the centrality of unwritten law to legal practice and interpretation, then they will be “misled into thinking the only choices are the plain text and judicial policymaking” which Baude says “is not true.” We would add only that one might even call this fundamentally false alternative an argument by slogan.
All this is a welcome development indeed. To be sure, given Baude’s recent vituperative rejection of the classical view of legal interpretation, it seems that the Owl of Minerva, symbol of wisdom, has once again waited until dusk to take wing. Nonetheless, it is better that wisdom should take wing at all than that the legal theorist learns nothing and forgets nothing. As Justice Felix Frankfurter famously observed, “wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”
Stripping Confederate Ties, the U.S. Navy Renames Two Vessels - The New York Times
One night in 1862, as the Civil War raged, an enslaved mariner named Robert Smalls seized an opportunity.
When the enlisted crew of a Confederate steamer disembarked for a night of carousing in Charleston, S.C., Mr. Smalls, the ship’s pilot, gathered his family and the other enslaved sailors and their families. He then steered the ship for a dramatic escape past heavy fortifications to Union-controlled waters and freedom.
Disguised in a top hat and a Confederate captain’s long overcoat, Mr. Smalls gave the passcodes at each of five Confederate forts and, once past the reach of cannon fire, hoisted a white flag of sewn-together bedsheets that his wife Hannah had made — delivering the ship to Union forces.
Mr. Smalls and the crew had lined the bottom of the boat with explosives to detonate rather than be recaptured and face execution.
From Slavery Abolition to Public Education, German Radicals Made American History
The United States has forgotten the radical German American immigrant socialists who spilled blood for antislavery and other liberatory causes.
North Dakota Supreme Court State Constitution Protects Right to Abortion
In Wrigley v. Romanick the North Dakota Supreme Court held that There is a fundamental right for a woman to obtain an abortion in instances where it is necessary to preserve her life or health..
Access Independent Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Red River Women’s Clinic has a substantial likelihood of succeeding in establishing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-12 is not narrowly tailored to the State’s compelling interests.
The North Dakota Constitution guarantees the “inalienable right[ ] ... of enjoying and defending life and liberty.” N.D. Const. art. I, § 1. Commonly, an individual exercises this right of self-defense by responding to a threat of imminent serious bodily injury or death with physical force. City of Jamestown v. Kastet, 2022 ND 40, ¶ 17, 970 N.W.2d 187; State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 20, 575 N.W.2d 658. Where a pregnancy raises a similar threat of serious bodily injury or death, the pregnant woman has a fundamental right to preserve her life and health with the aid of a physician.
Our recognition of this fundamental right to preserve one’s life does not depend on resolving the disputed point of pregnancy at which there are two lives that must be considered. The State has a compelling interest in protecting unborn human life, which RRWC does not dispute. Majority, at ¶ 29. We have long understood 20 that a woman has an inalienable right to employ deadly force against another person when necessary to protect herself against death or serious bodily injury. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 (N.D. 1983); United States v. Leighton, 3 Dakota 29, 13 N.W. 347, 348 (1882). Likewise, the State’s compelling interest on behalf of an unborn child must yield to the pregnant woman’s right to abort a pregnancy when necessary to preserve her life or health.
N. Dakota Supreme Court Blocks Abortion Ban; Says Constitution Protects Procedure - The New York Times
Wrigley v. Romanick, et al. 2023 ND 50 Highlight: There is a fundamental right for a woman to obtain an abortion in instances where it is necessary to preserve her life or health. |
Wednesday, March 15, 2023
The Full Audio Recording Of Judge Kyle Duncan At Stanford Law
Tuesday, March 14, 2023
Irish-American legal legend John Feerick
Monday, March 13, 2023
Irish-American legal legend John Feerick
In Defense of New Jersey's New Gun-Control Regime | New Jersey Law Journal
In Defense of New Jersey's New Gun-Control Regime
We urge Chief Judge Bumb to keep in mind that there is a long history of state and local governments regulating the possession of arms in public. We urge the attorney general to mount a rigorous defense of our elected representatives.
March 13, 2023 at 10:39 AM
6 minute read
At the heart of New Jersey’s gun-control regime has been the requirement to show the local chief of police a particularized need to lawfully carry a weapon. In two recent opinions, Chief Judge Renee Bumb first temporarily restrained certain provisions, and then on Jan. 30, in the consolidated action Siegel v. Platkin, extended her TRO to block the bulk of the newly enacted A-4769. Signed by Gov. Murphy, 2C:58-4.2 is our Legislature’s revision of the centerpiece New Jersey gun-control laws to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. Judge Bumb effectively gutted the law, saying it is fundamentally incompatible with the high court majority’s Bruen decision. We believe her broad injunction was not necessary. The judge called for an expedited briefing schedule on the motion for a preliminary injunction. But more is needed than briefs—the state should be able to develop a full record on the public health evidence for the court to make the determination regarding the public interest, which is essential to the issuance of an injunction.
The error is rooted in senior Justice Clarence Thomas’ opinion of the court, the conclusion of which six join. Two qualify their support (Brett Kavanaugh and John Roberts); Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissented. The Bruen opinion rejected the argument that the Second Amendment allows states to balance the needs of public safety against the constitutional right to carry firearms: “The Second Amendment ’is the very product of an interest balancing by the people’ and it ‘surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms’ for self-defense. Heller v. District of Columbia (2008). It is this balance—struck by the traditions of the American people—that demands our unqualified deference.”
Thomas’s opinion of the court explained that recent Circuit Court decisions have instructed “judges to ‘make difficult empirical judgments’ about ‘the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions,’ especially given their ‘lack [of] expertise’ in the field.”
We have long argued that the Second Amendment was intended to create a political right of the states to resist usurped federal authority—a proposition tested to destruction in 1861-65—and that its application to create a right to possess firearms for personal defense is rooted in both bad history and bad policy.
That being said, the individual right created in Heller was limited to possession in the home for last-ditch self defense, a constitutionalizing Lord Coke’s castle doctrine enunciated in Semayne’s Case (1604). Bruen ignores both Coke’s caution, noted only by Stephen Breyer’s dissent, that there was no right to go armed for protection in the marketplace and Justice Scalia’s statement in Heller that the Second Amendment did not limit the states’ power to regulate firearms in public.
After Bruen, the Second Amendment is now held to protect the right to defend oneself from deadly threat in public. But that right has always been limited to the use of necessary force. Like the First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly, its exercise can be restrained as to time, place, and manner.
Bruen is the law of the land as far as it goes, and Judge Bumb may not defy it. But Bruen is not, or at least not yet, the Second Amendment equivalent of Near v. Minnesota, prohibiting all prior restraint and leaving abuse of the right to be deterred only by litigation after the fact. Judge Bumb retains discretion to determine how far it does go and how much freedom of judgment it leaves to state legislatures. She should note, in particular the concurring opinion of Brett Kavanaugh, joined by John Roberts, the chief justice.
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion limits that of Justice Thomas. The chief and Justice Kavanaugh emphasize that licensing is still permitted, and that only the excessive discretion of the “may issue” states is constitutionally defective. Kavanaugh and Roberts recite Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion, which declares: “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”
Two fundamental issues remain to be addressed before Judge Bumb issues preliminary or permanent injunctions. She must answer whether the fundamental right of armed self defense is unreasonably burdened by each provision of the law. As a judge sitting in equity, she must address the public interest and ask whether making her order permanent would conduce to the overall good of the community. In this regard, the Legislature explicitly cites a compelling body of public health studies on the epidemic of gun violence in the United States.
We urge Chief Judge Bumb to keep in mind that there is a long history since the flintlock era of state and local governments regulating the possession of arms in public, as well as a wide range of balances struck by the diverse states in the present day. We also urge her to keep in mind the everyday experience and studies showing that gunpowder mixes badly with alcohol, with testosterone, and with the adrenaline produced by fear, particularly in the hands of the untrained. The United States is an outlier among modern democracies. We have 125 guns for every 100 people. Our gun homicide rate and our suicide rate are many times higher than other countries of comparable level of development.
In the next phase of the litigation it is incumbent on the state to defend New Jersey’s legislators’ right to learn from their own experience and respond in a reasoned way. One path forward is shown by the amicus brief which 15 states—including New Jersey—filed in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the comparable New York litigation Antonyuk v. Hochul. That 15 states joined in defense of New York shows that neither New Jersey nor New York is an outlier. Rather our part of the national experience demands respect as reasonable.
The 15 states muster substantial evidence that “sensitive place designations protect the public from a heightened risk of gun violence in such locations.” And that laws enacted by states to protect their residents need not be uniform: states are empowered to select “solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values,” ensuring that firearm regulations appropriately and effectively address the specific circumstances in each state.
We urge the attorney general to mount a rigorous defense of our elected representatives—mustering the strongest public health evidence possible of the public good to be served by reasonable limits on the time, place, and manner of possession of deadly weapons.
Sunday, March 12, 2023
Canadian Supreme Court Judge Put on Leave During Review of Altercation in Arizona - The New York Times
TORONTO — A member of Canada’s highest court confirmed on Friday that he had been placed on leave while a judicial body investigates his role in a violent altercation at an Arizona resort.
Justice Russell Brown, who was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, was temporarily relieved of his duties last month, the court said. A complaint into his conduct is under review at the Canadian Judicial Council, a 44-member organization that oversees disciplinary matters for federally appointed judges, the council said in a statement.
The nature of the complaint came to light on Friday via a report in The Vancouver Sun newspaper, but the complaint itself has not been released to the public. The council did not announce Justice Brown’s leave of absence until Tuesday, over five weeks after the investigation had begun.
The Sun identified the complainant as Jonathan Crump, a mortgage adviser and veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps, who told the paper that Justice Brown had been drunk at the Arizona resort and had “harassed” his friends.
Gillibrand, Others call for Jerome A. Cohen to receive the Presidential Medal of Freedom
OFFICE OF SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND [NY]
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, March 9th, 2023
Contact: Lizzie Landau, (202) 224-3873
GILLIBRAND, COLLEAGUES RECOMMEND PROFESSOR JEROME ALAN COHEN FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL MEDAL OF FREEDOM
WASHINGTON, D.C. - In recognition of his extraordinary work as a champion for human rights in East Asia, today, U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand is leading 5 of her colleagues in a bicameral letter to President Biden recommending Professor Jerome Alan Cohen for the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Over the course of his career, Professor Cohen helped create the field of East Asian legal studies, shaping how we understand China and East Asia in the U.S., and was a key player in the establishment of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. He has also helped secure the release of numerous individuals detained by authoritarian regimes, including CIA officer Jack Downey and democracy activist and later Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu.
The letter was also signed by Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and Representatives Daniel Goldman (D-NY-10), Jim McGovern (D-MA-2), and Jerrod Nadler (D-NY-12).
Read Senator Gillibrand’s full letter recommending Professor Cohen here.
Wednesday, March 8, 2023
Antideference: COVID, Climate, and the Rise of the Major Questions Canon - Richardson // Virginia Law Review
The major questions canon takes an entire class of
cases not only out of Chevron’s
deference regime, but out of any meaningful textual or contextual analysis.
Instead of avoiding the difficulties of applying the nondelegation doctrine,
the major questions canon achieves the same purpose sub rosa. Control over the bounds of the principle is entirely in
the hands of judges, with little clarity and no limiting principle. In short,
it licenses judicial policymaking while professing to protect Congress
and the people from agency overreach. [emph.added] The impacts on democratic
accountability and the effectiveness of administrative government are likely to
be profoundly negative.
The major questions canon purports to be
a matter of principle. It is in
reality a matter of power, an assertion of unbounded judicial supremacy in the
most important administrative law cases. The danger of major questions
juristocracy is that judges—specific people, with lifetime tenure—are empowered
to enact their political preferences. Gillian Metzger warned of a “1930s
Redux”, a boldly anti-administrative Court relitigating interbranch power struggles
thought resolved in the New Deal
Era.200 But the major questions canon gives the Court powers that
its 1930s counterparts never dreamt of.
Dorf on Law: Of Bruen, the Second Amendment, and Constitutional Insanity
At the end of the panel opinion, the judges said the following:
Doubtless, [the federal law] embodies salutary policy goals meant to protect vulnerable people in our society. Weighing those policy goals’ merits through the sort of means-end scrutiny our prior precedent indulged, we previously concluded that the societal benefits of [the law] outweighed its burden on Rahimi’s Second Amendment rights. But Bruen forecloses any such analysis in favor of a historical analogical inquiry into the scope of the allowable burden on the Second Amendment right. Through that lens, we conclude that [the law's] ban on possession of firearms is an outlier that our ancestors would never have accepted. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional, and Rahimi’s conviction under that statute must be vacated.
Again, what are we doing? A law that serves valuable "policy goals" today is unconstitutional because "our ancestors" would have rejected it? Our ancestors being white, propertied males who had the right to rape their wives and who did not think domestic violence was a problem? - ES
Tuesday, March 7, 2023
How long has this been going on? The Major Questions Doctrine and the Judicial Stranglehold on the President and Congress
How long has this been going on? The Major Questions Doctrine and the Judicial Stranglehold on the President and Congress
There’ll be time enough to analyze Judge Gorsuch’s work, but after reading a stack of his opinions over the weekend, the most salient parts of his judicial record are as follows:
1. A keen appreciation for constitutional structure as a guarantor of our rights and liberties.
2. A real devotion to originalism — probably more than the self described “faint hearted originalist” Antonin Scalia — and textualism.
3. Strong support for the freedom of speech and religion, and the First Amendment more broadly.
4. Skepticism of the administrative state.
Ilya Shapiro – Cato at Liberty – 2017
Five years is a blink of the eye on a court where service is for life and only a crime in broad daylight can end your tenure. But in that moment Neil Gorsuch has vindicated the hopes of his conservative celebrants. Ilya Shapiro – whose intemperate remarks deprecating then-nominee Ketanji Brown Jackson cost him a job at Georgetown – accurately forecast the role that then Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch – son of an anti-environmentalist EPA Administrator – would play on the high court.
When Henry the VIII chopped off the head of his Chancellor Thomas More, the author of Utopia, no one thought that a Chancellor could strike at the King himself. But the men who met in Philadelphia in 1787 so feared the monarch, that rather than declare Congressional/parliamentary Supremacy they separated the judiciary from the Executive. They doubtless had no clear sense of where that choice might lead. But by placing in separate judiciary the jurisdiction of both law and equity they laid the foundation for an adversarial relationship between judges and Executive.
Congress - a part time institution - 150 years later granted the judiciary oversight powers via the Administrative Procedure Act. But even the extensive powers granted did not satisfy everyone.
Four years ago Neil Gorsuch lamented that the high court’s 'Auer’ deference doctrine embedded “a systematic bias in favor of the federal government, the most powerful of parties, and against everyone else.” Pining for the days before the Administrative Procedure Act [APA] Justice Gorsuch , concurring in Kisor v. Wilkie, wrote “[O]verruling Auer” would take us “directly back to Skidmore [v. Swift & Co. (1944], liberating courts to decide cases based on their independent judgment and `follow [the] agency’s [view] only to the extent it is persuasive.”
Many expected that the expansive deference granted by emergency powers laws would see a period of extensive executive authority. But the election of Donald Trump, who delegated judicial selection to Mitch McConnell and Leonard Leo of the Federalist Society yielded a super majority on the Supreme Court eager to cabin the executive branch.
The process of reasoning by incomplete analogy has yielded the Major Questions Doctrine now enthroned by John Roberts in West Virginia v. EPA. The Chief Justice there rather breezily brought the phrase into the pantheon of interpretive maxims.
`Majorness' in King v. Burwell simply meant that the consequence of the interpretation urged by the objectors would be grossly contrary to the multiple objectives of a comprehensive legislation transforming a major part of the economy in a vital sector. Similarly in the Brown and Williamson case the Court recognized that even though nicotine could reasonably be understood as a drug, the use of tobacco was so deeply embedded in the culture that Congress plainly did not intend to give the FDA comprehensive authority
But in what Mila Sohoni has labeled the Major Questions Quartet the conservative 6-3 majority has embedded this vague slogan and elevated it to the status of Doctrine. Josh Chafetz - a Congressional scholar - has labeled the process judicial aggrandizement, and IP professor Mark Lemley has given it the name The imperial Supreme Court. They key fact is that in the relations between the three branches of government the Supreme Court - ideologically unified - has increased its power.
Taking advantage of a divided Congress, and its virtually unreviewable rulings on Constitutional grounds the unelected, life term judges are positioned to hobble a President and executive branch. They have chosen to do so by creating something called the Major Questions Doctrine. It is a sub-constitutional tool of untested but already demonstrably broad scope.
It’s vintage is very recent. The oldest case they rely on is Brown & Williamson v. FDA (2000). That decision can be readily defended on the grounds that it was a qualitative expansion of administrative power by the FDA which - reasonably characterized nicotine as a drug and cigarets as a means of delivering the drug. But to regulate tobacco required an administrative regime which no one doubted Congress had not intended to authorize. So ordinary principles of statutory construction were sufficient to reach the result - that the FDA was not empowered to regulate cigarets as a drug.
The Doctrine really comes into its own only with Alabama Association of Realtors in 2021. The court, per curiam writes:
The CDC relied on §361(a) of the Public Health Service Act for authority to promulgate and extend the eviction moratorium. See 58 Stat. 703, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §264(a). That provision states:
“The Surgeon General, with the approval of the [Secretary of Health and Human Services], is authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.
For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.”
See also 42 CFR §70.2 (2020) (delegating this authority to the CDC).
Even if the text were ambiguous, the sheer scope of the CDC’s claimed authority under §361(a) would counsel against the Government’s interpretation. We expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of “vast ‘economic and political significance.’”
From that modest beginning a new Doctrine has sprung. No longer a tool of statutory construction, it has become a substantive rule of law: that Congressional authority - and therefore Executive authority as the good faith executor of Congressional will, cannot act unless the statutory mandate is “clear”.
That is the situation that Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar faced last week as she rose to defend the Secretary of Education’s plan to waive modest amounts of student loan debt for millions of Americans.
- George Conk
March 7, 2023
Biden Loan relief gets Cold Reception - Amy Howe
Oral Argument - Biden v Nebraska. Transcript
Opening Statement - SG Elizabeth Prelogar 383 words, 2 minutes
Memorandum of the Department of Justice in support of the student loan forgiveness plan
Monday, March 6, 2023
Eric Foner · Double V: Military Racism · LRB 2 March 2023
by Matthew F. Delmont.
Viking, 374 pp., £25.69, October 2022,
by Beth Bailey.
North Carolina, 360 pp., £36.95, May,
In American popular memory, the Second World War remains the ‘good war’, fought, to borrow the title of Tom Brokaw’s 1998 book, by the ‘greatest generation’. It is remembered as a time of national unity that not only destroyed tyrannies overseas but assimilated young men from all regions and ethnic backgrounds into a shared American identity. The war in Vietnam, by contrast, is widely viewed as a needless contest fought by an army that fell apart while experiencing the aftershocks of social divisions at home. Its legacy, reinforced by misbegotten wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ – a reluctance among political leaders and the broader public to become involved in combat in faraway places.
Two new books challenge these ideas. After reading Matthew F. Delmont’s Half American, the greatest generation, or at least its white component, seems considerably diminished. Although more than a million African Americans served in the armed forces during the Second World War, the default soldier in representations of the war is almost always white. When one directs attention to the Black experience, Delmont writes, ‘nearly everything’ about that war looks different. What, for example, was the conflict’s purpose? Roosevelt’s claim that it was being fought to ensure universal enjoyment of the Four Freedoms (freedom of speech and religion, freedom from want and from fear) rang hollow for many African Americans denied basic civil and political rights at home. Delmont’s title is taken from a letter by a Black cafeteria worker in Wichita, Kansas, to the Pittsburgh Courier, a leading Black newspaper, just after the attack on Pearl Harbor. ‘Should I sacrifice my life,’ he wondered, ‘to live half American?’ The Courier used the letter to launch the campaign for a ‘Double V’ – victory over fascism abroad and Jim Crow at home.
Delmont, who teaches history at Dartmouth College, employs an impressive variety of sources – diaries, letters, newspapers, military and government documents – to explore the deep-seated racism of the armed forces and the emergence during the Second World War of a militant movement for racial justice. Beth Bailey’s focus in An Army Afire is somewhat different. A professor of history at the University of Kansas and director of its Centre for Military, War and Society Studies, Bailey paints a sympathetic portrait of the army’s struggle to adjust to the radical social changes sweeping the US, to which the military could hardly remain immune.
African Americans have served in every significant war conducted by the United States. But they almost always had to fight for the right to fight. During the War of Independence, the Continental Army initially excluded Blacks, a policy reversed only when the British offered freedom to slaves who enlisted in their ranks. Between the American Revolution and the Civil War, Black men were almost entirely barred from the militia and regular army, although during the War of 1812 Andrew Jackson called on Louisiana’s free Black militia – a legacy of French rule – to help defeat the British at the Battle of New Orleans. Jackson, who owned many slaves, issued an address condemning the exclusion of Blacks from the army as a ‘mistaken policy’ and praising the Black soldiers as ‘sons of freedom’.