United States Killed Iraqi Military Official and Iraqi Military Personnel in the Two Recent Attacks - Just Security

 
Shia Imam Rouhalla Khomeini in exile - Najaf, Iraq
United States Killed Iraqi Military Official and Iraqi Military Personnel in the Two Recent Attacks - Just Security

by Crispin Smith

The New York Times’ leading reporter Maggie Haberman wrote on Friday, “This is the thing that hasn’t fully penetrated for people – Soleimani was part of the state.” She was building off a statement by retired General David Petraeus who outlined the significance of the General’s position in the Iranian government. But there’s another thing that hasn’t fully penetrated, if at all. The other person that U.S. officials celebrated killing in that same strike was part of another state: Iraq. What’s more, the members of the Iranian-backed militia group that the U.S. killed a few days earlier—an action that triggered the storming of the U.S. embassy—were also part of the Iraqi military forces.

If these dimensions of the unfolding events are not properly understood by U.S. decision makers and the media, the currently highly volatile situation—between the United States, Iran, and Iraq—is even more likely to spiral out of control.

As I will explain in detail below, the militia group Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) is legally a part of the Iraqi armed forces, and has been since the tail end of 2016. Despite its close links to Iran, and limited willingness to obey the Iraqi chain of command, the Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Forces) militias — to which KH belongs — were incorporated into the Iraqi military by a series of laws and Prime Ministerial orders. The U.S. airstrike on Dec. 29 was aimed at members of KH, leaving around 25 fighters dead. The U.S. airstrike launched at dawn on January 3 that killed Suleimani also killed KH’s founder and leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Along with the strong condemnation of the U.S. attacks by the Government of Iraq, it is highly doubtful that the airstrikes were undertaken with Baghdad’s consent. As such, the United States has not only launched an armed attack on Iran, but in effect it has also attacked the Republic of Iraq—twice in five days.

[Note: As this article was going to press, the New York Times reported that the United States knew Muhandis had come into the target site when conducting the strike, even though it was Suleimani who was the target of the attack. What’s more, the Times, paraphrasing an anonymous U.S. official, said that the strike would have been called off if Suleimani was meeting with “Iraqi government officials allied with Americans.” Most readers might miss the qualifier. It suggests if Suleimani was meeting with Iraqi government officials who were not “allied with Americans,” the attack could possibly still be carried out. And, indeed, the U.S. official told the Times that Muhandis was considered a “‘clean party,’ meaning members of the Kataib Hezbollah.” In short, the United States considered the attack that would kill an Iraqi government official a clean shot. That said, it’s unclear to what extent U.S. military planners and senior U.S. officials understood Muhandis’ position within the Iraqi military. Indeed, that lack of understanding is part of the problem this article attempts to resolve.]

What is Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Hashd al-Sha’abi?

The Hashd al-Sha’abi or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is a collection of militias that formed in 2014 to counter the Islamic State (ISIS). As ISIS forces encroached on Baghdad, the then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Iraq’s chief Shi’ite cleric Ali al-Sistani each issued calls for the people to rise up against the threat. Thousands of Iraqis answered this call forming a range of militias which came to be known collectively as the Hashd al-Sha’abi. Broadly, these militias fell into three categories. Those militias in the first category tend to be organized around local or ethnic minority affiliation. The other two categories are Shi’ite-majority units. Of these Shi’ite units, the militias (broadly speaking) are either loyal to the Baghdad government and relatively moderate Shi’ite leaders such as Sistani, or are loyal to Iran with links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Iran-backed militias tended to have existed for many years, having formed during or before the U.S. invasion in 2003. Such militias are completely illegal under Iraq’s constitution, which prohibits non-state armed groups under article 9. However, the 2014 calls to arms allowed formerly illegal Iranian proxies to enjoy at least tacit legitimacy and greatly swelled ranks.

The target of the late December U.S. strike, Kata’ib Hezbollah, is one of those pre-existing Iranian-linked militias, founded in 2003 by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis — a dual Iraqi-Iranian national. He was killed on Friday alongside Qassem Suleimani. From its inception, his group took a prominent role attacking U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq during and after the 2007 “Surge,” and KH remains on the U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, having been listed in 2009. Despite those facts, and despite KH’s existence having been a clear violation of Iraq’s constitution, KH has remained prominent, buoyed by Iranian training and equipment, and in 2014 it became one of the preexisting militias that formed the core of the Hashd al-Sha’abi movement. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis took on a prominent role in the overall leadership of the Hashd al-Sha’abi, and was, until his death, the Deputy Chairman of its governing committee. KH’s strong position within the Hashd al-Sha’abi has increased the group’s influence — and through the Hashd al-Sha’abi it has become a de jure (even if not de facto) part of the Iraqi state. How so? Through formal incorporation.

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