Wednesday, January 11, 2023

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it? Justices consider whether to alter the National Guard collective-bargaining landscape - SCOTUSblog

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it? Justices consider whether to alter the National Guard collective-bargaining landscape - SCOTUSblog
By Michael C.Duff (St. Louis University)

From the beginning of Monday’s oral argument in Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, it was crystal clear that Ohio Solicitor General Benjamin Flowers would focus like a laser beam on the claim that the FLRA has no statutory authority to issue orders against state agencies.

“The Reform Act defines agencies to include executive departments, government corporations, and independent establishments,” he said, referring to a 1978 federal law that established collective-bargaining rights for employees of the federal government. “Adjutants General and state Guards are none of these things.” Ohio now clearly concedes that the dual-status National Guard technicians at issue in the case are federal employees by virtue of The Technicians’ Act. But, argued Flowers strenuously, that designation did not “convert” state agencies to federal agencies against whom the FLRA may issue orders. Justice Clarence Thomas underscored the concern: “That’s the leap that I’m having some difficulty with.”

But Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson focused on the congressional intent behind federal employee designation of the technicians — who are state employees for some purposes, and federal employees when engaged in other functions: organizing, administering, instructing, or training of the National Guard; and the maintenance and repair of supplies issued to the National Guard. Jackson asked, respecting the delegation of federal employee status to technicians, “Surely you’re not saying that we can just decide whatever we want about this policy without reference to what Congress intended.” Flowers responded: “As long as congressional intent is interpreted with respect to the statute.”

So, the textualist arguments were framed as Ohio might have liked. But the fly in the ointment continues to be that Ohio has acquiesced to the dual-employment arrangement — and benefitted from it — since the 1970s. The important factual context here is that when workers are engaged in federal employment they receive federal employment benefits (including the right to collectively bargain) and those benefits help the Guard recruit highly qualified individuals. Still, as Justice Neil Gorsuch hypothesized, the arrangement might trigger constitutional notions of federal commandeering were it not for broad state consent to this model of collective bargaining over the preceding half-century. Though — as developed during the argument — there were legislative efforts decades ago to upset the model, those efforts failed. Congress appears to have accepted the arrangement, even though it has not attempted to include the local Guard, or the state adjutant generals who act as the commanders of each state’s Guard, under the definition of “agency.” And Justice Sonia Sotomayor invoked what she called Justice Elena Kagan’s “venerable rule” (though she was actually quoting Kagan from the first case argued on Monday): “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 

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The New Judicial Power Grab: Josh Chafetz

 

Chafetz, Josh, The New Judicial Power Grab (January 10, 2023). St. Louis University Law Journal, Vol. 67, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4321887



Monday, January 9, 2023

5th Circuit, en banc, nixes bumpstock ban//Law 360


The John Minor Wisdom Courthouse, New Orleans
Home of the 5th Circuit


 
The consequences of the Supreme Court majority's embrace of the right to go armed in public continue to play out.  Last week a minister's claim that he has a First Amendment right to carry a pistol in on the pulpit was vindicated by a federal District Jduue in Rochester, NY.   Now this decision from the entire 5th Circuit - a Court which led the fight to implement the promise of Brown v. Board of Education.  the right to be armed seems to motivate that court now with the passion their predecessors - like John Minor Wisdom-  once brought to eliminating racism in education root and branch. - GWC 1/9/23

5th Circuit, en banc, nixes bumpstock ban 

Product Liability Law360 news-alt@law360.com 

Law360 (January 6, 2023, 11:40 PM EST) -- The full Fifth Circuit on Friday struck down a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' rule banning bump stocks, reversing a Texas federal court's decision and subsequent panel ruling upholding the rule following the appellate court's en banc review.

In a split 13-3 decision, the Fifth Circuit majority held that a bump stock doesn't qualify as a "machine gun" under federal law, and the ATF therefore lacked the authority to prohibit bump stocks.

The en banc ruling vacates a Fifth Circuit panel's December 2021 decision finding that the ATF was correct to interpret the definition of a machine gun to include bump stocks, as it was Congress' intent to address the rate of firearms, not the specific mechanism that allows for it.

On Friday, the Fifth Circuit majority sided with firearms instructor Michael Cargill, who challenged the 2019 ban in Texas federal court. In doing so, it held that a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a non-mechanical bump stock doesn't constitute a weapon that "shoots, is designated to shoot or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically, more than one shot … by a single function of the trigger," the court said Friday, citing the Gun Control Act of 1968's definition of a machine gun.

Specifically, the majority said that every shot fired by a bump stock-equipped semi-automatic rifle requires a separate function of the trigger. And that means that it can't be interpreted as a machine gun under the statute prohibiting them.

Writing for the majority, U.S. Circuit Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod said that, in defining a "machine gun," Congress "referred to the mechanism by which the gun's trigger causes bullets to be fired. Policy judgments aside, we are bound to apply that mechanical definition. And applying that definition to a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a non-mechanical bump stock, we conclude that such a weapon is not a machine gun for purposes of the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act."

She added that she cannot say the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act "give fair warning that possession of a non-mechanical bump stock is a crime."

"Many commentators argue that non-mechanical bump stocks contribute to firearm deaths and that the final rule is good public policy," Judge Elrod said. "We express no opinion on those arguments because it is not our job to determine our nation's public policy. That solemn responsibility lies with the Congress, and our task is confined to deciding cases and controversies, which requires us to apply the law as Congress has written it."

Ultimately, the bump stock ban violates the Administrative Procedure Act, according to the decision. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine "the proper scope of relief," which could be injunctive, declarative "or otherwise."

In his dissent, U.S. Circuit Judge Stephen A. Higginson — joined by U.S. Circuit Judges James L. Dennis and James E. Graves Jr. — said a bump stock should indeed be a machine gun within the meaning of the law. In particular, Judge Higginson said he disagreed with the majority's use of lenity to "rewrite this statute."

Under the rule of lenity, an ambiguous law must be applied in a manner that is most favorable to the defendant or construe it against the state. Judge Higginson said the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that the rule of lenity only applies if there's a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute" to the point that a court must "simply guess" as to what Congress intended. It is intended to only be deployed as a "last resort," the judge said.

"Today, our court extends lenity, once a rule of last resort, to rewrite a vital public safety statute banning machine guns," Judge Higginson said.

He noted that the bump stock is a "device that helped the Las Vegas shooter fire over 1,000 rounds during an 11-minute long attack, at times shooting about nine bullets per second, killing at least 58 people and wounding hundreds more."

"Therefore, our court uses lenity to legalize an instrument of mass murder," Judge Higginson said.

U.S. Circuit Judge Catharina Haynes penned a short concurrence, which Chief Judge Priscilla Richman joined, writing, "I concur in judgment only because I reluctantly conclude that the relevant statute is so ambiguous such that the rule of lenity favors the citizen in this case."

On top of that, Judge Richman joined another concurrence written by U.S. Circuit Judge James C. Ho. In that concurrence, which was also joined by U.S. Circuit Judge Leslie H. Southwick, Judge Ho wrote that it is not enough to conclude that a criminal statute should cover a particular act.

"The statute must clearly and unambiguously cover the act," he said.

He likened the bump stock issue to designer drugs, which he said don't fit within the definitions established by the Controlled Substances Act but are just as lethal. The same policy justifications for banning scheduled drugs readily applied to designer drugs, he said.

"Yet all three branches agreed that existing law did not ban designer drugs," Judge Ho said.

The New Civil Liberties Alliance, which represents Cargill in the case, said in a statement Friday that it is pleased that a circuit court has recognized "that Congress must be the one to pass any bump stock ban."

"The resulting circuit split should bring this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court's attention promptly and supply a suitable vehicle for deciding this issue once and for all," the NCLA said.

ATF declined to comment late Friday.

Several other federal appeals courts have upheld the ATF's 2019 ban, including the Tenth Circuit, which declined to hold an en banc rehearing in March 2021 after affirming a decision in a similar suit in May 2020.

The ATF's ban was proposed in the wake of the deadly October 2017 shooting at the Mandalay Bay hotel in Las Vegas, where the shooter used a bump stock to rapidly fire his rifle. The ban took effect March 2019.

Cargill claimed in his suit that the ATF exceeded its authority, arguing that the ban goes against the plain language of the National Firearms Act. That law prohibits the possession of machine guns.

The district court tossed his suit, but Cargill appealed, arguing that the National Firearms Act's definition of machine guns as weapons that shoot "more than one shot … by a single function of the trigger" excludes bump stocks. Bump stocks use the gun's recoil to quickly effect multiple trigger pulls, Cargill said.

A three-judge Fifth Circuit panel disagreed with Cargill, but a majority of Fifth Circuit judges voted to grant an en banc rehearing in June 2022.

Cargill is represented by Richard Samp and Mark Chenoweth of the New Civil Liberties Alliance.

The government is represented by Brian M. Boynton, Ashley C. Hoff, Mark B. Stern, Michael Raab, Abby C. Wright, Brad Hinshelwood and Kyle T. Edwards of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The case is Cargill v. Garland et al., case number 20-51016, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

–Additional reporting by Mike Curley. Editing by Michael Watanabe.

Hakeem Jeffries passes the gavel

 What do I have in common with the Democratic Party leaders in the House of Representatives, and the United States Senate?  Brooklyn natives.



Hakeem Jeffries as he passes the gavel to Kevin McCarthy

“I was born in Brooklyn hospital and raised in a working class neighborhood in Crown Heights… Somehow survived the violence or the crack cocaine epidemic and wound up here in the United States Congress, as the highest ranking Democrat in the House of Representatives.

“America is truly a land of opportunity… On this first day, let us commit to the American dream that promises that if you work hard and play by the rules, you should be able to provide a comfortable living for yourself and for your family.” - Hakeem Jeffries, Minority Leader, U.S.House of Representatives.

Sunday, January 8, 2023

I am not alone

Saturday, January 7, 2023

South Carolina Constitution Includes Abortion Right, State Supreme Court Rules - The New York Times
Jan. 5, 2023
Planned Parenthood v. State of South Carolina Opinion 28127, January 5, 2023


The South Carolina Constitution provides a right to privacy that includes the right to abortion, the state’s Supreme Court ruled on Thursday, saying “the decision to terminate a pregnancy rests upon the utmost personal and private considerations imaginable.”

The decision overturns the state’s law banning abortions after roughly the sixth week of pregnancy. More broadly, it is a victory for abortion rights in the South, where states have severely restricted access.

It is the first final ruling by a state Supreme Court on the state constitutionality of abortion since the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in June, which ended the right to abortion under the federal constitution that had been in force for half a century, and left the matter to the states.

Abortion rights groups responded to that decision by filing suits in 19 states, seeking to establish a right to abortion under state constitutions, in many cases citing explicit provisions in those documents protecting a woman’s privacy and equal rights. The South Carolina case was a critical first test — and success — for that strategy.

Friday, January 6, 2023

South Carolina Constitution Includes Abortion Right, State Supreme Court Rules - The New York Times

South Carolina Constitution Includes Abortion Right, State Supreme Court Rules - The New York Times
Jan. 5, 2023
Planned Parenthood v. State of South Carolina Opinion 28127, January 5, 2023


The South Carolina Constitution provides a right to privacy that includes the right to abortion, the state’s Supreme Court ruled on Thursday, saying “the decision to terminate a pregnancy rests upon the utmost personal and private considerations imaginable.”

The decision overturns the state’s law banning abortions after roughly the sixth week of pregnancy. More broadly, it is a victory for abortion rights in the South, where states have severely restricted access.

It is the first final ruling by a state Supreme Court on the state constitutionality of abortion since the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in June, which ended the right to abortion under the federal constitution that had been in force for half a century, and left the matter to the states.

Abortion rights groups responded to that decision by filing suits in 19 states, seeking to establish a right to abortion under state constitutions, in many cases citing explicit provisions in those documents protecting a woman’s privacy and equal rights. The South Carolina case was a critical first test — and success — for that strategy.

How should non-textualists talk about the major question doctrine’s legitimacy? (and on Kisor-ing the MQD) - Adminwannabe Com

How should non-textualists talk about the major question doctrine’s legitimacy? (and on Kisor-ing the MQD) - Adminwannabe Com
By Beau Baumann

Today, the Federalist Society hosted a debate between Ilan Wurman and Chad Squitieri on the major questions doctrine (the “MQD”). The debate was interesting and it reminded me about something I was pondering over the holidays. The debate was framed around whether the MQD is consistent with textualism/originalism. The textualist critique of the MQD has a really different flavor from the non-textualist critiques. When Chad and Ilan are debating the MQD, they’re holding a canon of statutory interpretation up against a pre-loaded conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation. In an important sense, they’re talking about whether the MQD is a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation by channeling their shared grammar for evaluating judicial doctrine.

That conversation, the textualist debate on the MQD, has all the warm familiarity of a genre movie. A textualist who wants to write that paper can call on all the “moves” that people have been making in textualist papers for thirty years. That’s not to say that textualists don’t have sub rosa disagreements that we often just glide right over. But they at least have a shared language for debating whether the absurdity doctrine, avoidance, lenity, and Chevron deference are inconsistent with a textualist’s take on the judicial role in statutory interpretation. Justice Barrett, for example, wrote a paper examining substantive canons’ consistency with textualism and legislative supremacy. Whether a textualist critique of the MQD is a good or bad paper just turns on the level of craft, kind of like the director of a straight-up western.

By contrast, non-textualist critiques of the MQD have focused on describing the MQD’s horrendous consequences. To be clear, that’s important work. We have papers describing the likelihood that the MQD will calcify political polarization into judicial doctrine, make it more difficult for the federal government to tackle global issues like climate change, and undermine our national security apparatus. And you have many papers suggesting that the MQD makes for bad judicial doctrine because it is unmanageable. But while these papers suggest that the MQD is bad doctrine, they only discuss whether the MQD is an appropriate tool of statutory interpretation when leveling a hypocrisy charge at the conservative and avowedly textualist justices for moving beyond text. So if you, like me, cynically think that the consequences and imprecision of the MQD are entirely foreseeable and perhaps intentional, then it’s hard to think that these papers will persuade anyone not already disposed towards viewing the MQD with suspicion. (I don’t think anybody still supporting the MQD will be turned around by charges that the doctrine—gasp—has a deregulatory bend.)

I think there’s at least a few reasons why non-textualist critics of the MQD have avoided making similar claims. First, and most obviously, non-textualist critics of the MQD lack a preloaded and ascendant conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation. Second, and relatedly, non-textualists are probably feel pretty queasy about reinforcing the kind of formalism that defines modern textualism and originalism. The best way to approach the MQD is as judicial policymaking. Once we acknowledge that the descriptive case for the MQD—the idea that Congress “speaks” clearly when addressing major questions—is just a really bizarre fiction, all roads lead to acknowledging that the MQD is judicial policymaking. I don’t think anybody seriously thinks the MQD is required either by the Constitution or anything else. Even the most hardcore pro-MQD constitutional formalists think it is a second-best option to the nondelegation doctrine. But if you think the MQD is about “second-best originalism,” that’s still a question of policymaking.[i] Non-textualist critics of the MQD can evaluate the doctrine as judicial policymaking—there’s plenty of work to be done there—but to do so critically may require approaches that are unpalatable to purposivists and pragmatists.

Regardless, there’s a noticeable hole in the literature where the non-textualist take on the MQD’s legitimacy should be. Just as an avid consumer of the literature and low-level participant, I’m hoping 2023 is the year where we get more of these kinds of critiques of the MQD. I don’t really mean to suggest that MQD critics ought to adopt any particular conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation. I just think that whatever your priors on judicial policymaking, folks can do a lot of work in making those priors explicit and evaluating the MQD accordingly. I think there’s a ton of ways to do this without dipping a toe into textualism.

My own thinking on this has evolved over the last year. I’m trying to more rigorously separate my reasons for thinking that the MQD is bad from my suspicions that the doctrine is illegitimate. For me, it all goes back to interpretation-construction distinction (which is a concept for the judicial role that may be older than the Republic). My whole worldview in statutory interpretation acknowledges that there’s some role for judicial policymaking at the tail end of the interpretive process—at least as it has been done in this country since the Founding. But it’s not limitless and the limits are what I’m bringing to the table when I call the MQD an illegitimate tool of judicial self-aggrandizement. Confining courts’ policymaking to construction keeps them from overriding statutory text, undoing legislative supremacy, and subverting democracy. Reinforcing the interpretation-construction distinction is basically what the Court already did in Kisor. (Dibs on the “we just need to Kisor the MQD” essay.) Before Kisor, Chevron and Auer skeptics complained that deference was leading to judicial abnegation. Judges were deferring without giving an honest go at following their best read of statutory and regulatory text. So the Kisor Court made abundantly clear that lower courts are only to defer after they jump through a bunch of hoops. Chevron and Auer are tools of construction, only to be applied in cases of ambiguity as a last resort. MQD just does what critics were always accusing Chevron and Auer of doing. If we did manage to Kisor the MQD, well then the construction zone is a more acceptable place for judicial policymaking. Afterall, judges need to decide cases somehow, even if statutes are hopelessly ambiguous. (I’d prefer if they minimized their judicial policymaking more aggressively but c’est la vie.) If the MQD were a tool of last resort, it would still be awful in my eyes—you know, judicial self-aggrandizement, “made up” yada-yada—but I couldn’t say that there was anything illegitimate about it—at least as a question of judicial practices that have existed for hundreds of years. I wouldn’t even bother to write about that MQD.

Overall, I think that it’s important to start addressing the legitimacy of the MQD. When the shoe was on the other foot, when Chevron skepticism was in its highest gear, scholars, practitioners, and activists objected that Chevron was illegitimate. That language of legitimacy is important for persuasion when folks disagree about their policy priors. To do that kind of work with the MQD, you have to invoke some theory of the judicial role explicitly and hold it up against what the Court is doing.


Electric Chair vs firing squad: Suth Carolina Supreme Court

 



January 5, 2023  Oral argument before the five member South Carolina Supreme Court

https://media.sccourts.org/videos/2022-001280.mp4

Thursday, January 5, 2023

American conservatives don't understand the late Pope Benedict's legacy | National Catholic Reporter

American conservatives don't understand the late Pope Benedict's legacy | National Catholic Reporter
By Michael Sean Winters

The myopia of American Catholics has been on full display this week as they rush to canonize or demonize the late Pope Benedict XVI, and to contrast his time as pope with that of the current pontiff, Pope Francis.

Raymond Arroyo was on Fox News explaining, "We needed his voice, his clarity, especially now." The "now" implies a contrast with what conservative Catholics have complained is the "confusion" of Francis' pastoral style.

"You might say this is the definitive drawing down of the curtain on Vatican II," said Bishop Robert Barron of Winona-Rochester, Minnesota. You might, but you would be wrong. Barron seems not to realize that the universal church is in the midst of a synodal process that is, in its essence, about continuing the reception of Vatican II.

Ross Douthat, in The New York Times, opined that Benedict's resignation backfired:

What the resignation yielded, though, was not what Benedict had presumably expected ... the Francis pontificate was quickly defined by a sweeping push for liberalization, a striking shift of personnel and policy and a reopening of many of the 1970s-era debates that Benedict had tried to settle.

Yes, there have been some changes in personnel, and Francis, a pastor with a keen theological mind, approaches some issues differently from the way Benedict, a theologian with a pastoral heart, did.

What these three conservative voices miss is that for all the differences of style and approach, all popes do their best to articulate a Catholic response to the challenges of their times, not a liberal or conservative one. These would-be defenders of the Ratzingerian legacy ignore the obvious points of continuity between Benedict and Francis.

Workers install a mosaic depicting Pope Francis next to the one depicting Pope Benedict XVI in St. Paul's Basilica in Rome Dec. 9, 2013. (CNS/Reuters/Alessandro Bianchi)

Workers install Workers install a mosaic depicting Pope Francis next to the one depicting Pope Benedict XVI in St. Paul's Basilica in Rome Dec. 9, 2013. (CNS/Reuters/Alessandro Bianchi)

Nowhere is that continuity more obvious than in the area of Catholic social teaching. Benedict "pushed the tradition forward on both ecological and economic justice," Meghan Clark, a theologian at St. John's University, told me via email.

"Caritas in Veritate may be an overly dense document, but it provides a clear bridge from John Paul II's cautions about unfettered capitalism and Francis's exposing structures of inequality and exclusion," she said. "What prompted George Weigel to rant about red and gold pens, at the core, was that."

Clark was referencing Weigel's criticism of Benedict's 2009 encyclical, Caritas in Veritate, in which Weigel tried to minimize certain themes in the text by suggesting Benedict had not really written them.

What becomes clear, as Italian theologian Massimo Borghese demonstrated in his book Catholic Discordance is that Weigel, joined by fellow neoconservatives Richard John Neuhaus and Michael Novak, tried to suggest Pope John Paul II was charting a new course in his 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus. That text included a couple of paragraphs praising contemporary market economics for which the trio claimed credit. They hoped that section might have proven seminal. Instead, Benedict's Caritas in Veritate firmly shut the door on any doctrinal development along neoconservative lines.

Clark also points to another area where Benedict's writings resonated especially with those on the Catholic left.

"American Catholics struggle with the relationship between charity and justice," Clark said.  "Charitable work is important but it is no substitute for building a more just society. Benedict XVI 's Caritas in Veritate provides no quarter for those who think charity or philanthropy are a sufficient response to injustice: 'I cannot give what is mine to the other, without first giving him what pertains to him in justice.' "

Anthony Annett, author of Cathonomics: How Catholic Tradition Can Create a More Just Economy, said Americans need to appreciate Benedict's past as a person who grew up in postwar Germany to understand his perspective.

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Biden cracks down on illegal border crossings, blaming Republicans for stalemate  | Courthouse News Service



Biden cracks down on illegal border crossings, blaming Republicans for stalemate  | Courthouse News Service
By Kelsey Reichmann  January 5, 2022

WASHINGTON (CN) — President Joe Biden offered new solutions to curb illegal immigration on Thursday, announcing restrictions to expel more asylum seekers while slamming Republicans in Congress for not doing more. 

“These actions alone that I'm going to announce today aren't going to fix our entire immigration system, but they can help us a good deal in better managing what is a difficult challenge,” Biden said during remarks from the White House. 

The new restrictions will encourage migrants to seek lawful pathways and punish those who enter the country illegally. Each month, Biden will make U.S. entry possible for up to 30,000 migrants from Nicaragua, Haiti and Cuba who have an eligible sponsor and pass vetting requirements. These individuals will receive work authorizations and be allowed to stay in the country for a period of two years. 

“My message is this, if you're trying to leave Cuba, Nicaragua or Haiti, do not do not just show up at the border,” Biden said. “Stay where you are and apply legally from there. Starting today, if you don't apply to the legal process you will not be eligible for this new parole program. And I reiterate, you need a lawful sponsor in the United States of America.”

Aiming to keep the asylum system from being overwhelmed, Biden will send up to 30,000 migrants from Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua to Mexico each month. Citizens from these countries have not been subject to Title 42 — a Trump-era public health order that expelled individuals based on pandemic measures.

Biden has been fighting to terminate Title 42, but the Supreme Court halted the administration from doing so pending its review of a challenge by red states. Biden said Thursday he is confident the public health order will come to an end when the high court rules. Once Title 42 is inactive, the administration will revert back to Title 8 measures. 

“I don't like Title 42, but it's the law now and we have to operate within it,” Biden said.

To crack down on illegal immigration, Biden will expel migrants who enter the country without permission and subject them to a five-year ban on reentry. The new regulations will give migrants more opportunities to enter the country lawfully, however, including the use of a mobile application to schedule asylum appointments with Customs and Border Patrol. 

“Look, we should all recognize that as long as America is the land of freedom and opportunity, people are going to try to come here and that's what many of our ancestors did,” Biden said. “And it's no surprise that it's happening again today. We can't stop people from making the journey, but we can require them to come here in an orderly way under U.S. law.”

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Prose Poetry Fallows on Zelensky's New speech

https://open.substack.com/pub/fallows/p/everyone-is-here-prose-poetry?r=zv1g&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email

Tuesday, January 3, 2023

The Trumpiest Court in America ...The Fifth Circuit - Ian Millhiser //VOX Media



 They have the nerve to meet in the John Minor Wisdom courthouse New Orleans.  But today's judges of the historic Fifth Circuit  Court of Appeals do not respect the intellectual legacy of the great judge of the post Brown v. Board of Education and civil rights era.  Now at least one member - Judge James Ho - recently declared that he is so repelled by the liberalism of Yale law graduates that he will no longer consider them as candidates for post-graduate law clerks.

But it was a different era when the old Fifth Circuit was severed by a resentful conservative Congress in 1981.  The New York Times then reported on its demise in a piece by Frances Frank Marcus:

Accompanied by an assortment of unjudicial sounds, the clicking of cameras, reminiscing, occasional laughter and a few tears, the 90-year-old United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose judges desegregated the Deep South, went out of existence here today.

In its place, after formal ceremonies and informal celebrations, a new, much-diminished Fifth Circuit Court began, a little more than half the size of the old court. The formal splitting of the 26-judge Fifth Circuit into two more manageable appellate courts will be completed tomorrow, with another ceremony opening the newly formed 11th Circuit in Atlanta.

Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, the New Orleans legal scholar famous for his liberal decisions in civil rights cases, wrote that when ''Congress sliced a great court in two'' last Oct. 15, it was ''a day of mourning.''

Despite opposition from Judge Wisdom and others, the court has been split in all but name for some months, with 14 judges allocated for the new Fifth Circuit, which represents Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi and the Canal Zone. There are 12 judges in the new 11th Circuit, which comprises Georgia, Alabama and Florida. 'An Administrative Necessity'

- GWC 

The Trumpiest Court in America ...The Fifth Circuit 

By  Ian Millhiser

Trent Taylor says his cell, in a Texas psychiatric unit operated by the state’s prison system, was covered in human excrement. Feces smeared the window and streaked the ceiling. Someone had painted a shit swastika on the wall, alongside a smiley face. According to Taylor’s allegations in a federal lawsuit, there was such a thick layer of dried human dung on the floor of the cell that it made a crunching sound as he walked naked across the cell.

Taylor alleged that he was kept in this cell for four days, where he neither ate nor drank due to fears that the excrement, which was even packed inside the cell’s water faucet, would contaminate anything he consumed. Then, on the fifth day, he was moved to a bare, frigid cell with no toilet, water fountain, or bed. A clogged drain filled the new cell with choking ammonia films. With nowhere to relieve himself, Taylor held his urine for 24 hours before he could do so no longer. And then he had to sleep alone on the floor while covered in his own waste.

The Supreme Court eventually ruled 7–1 that Taylor’s lawsuit against the corrections officers who forced him to live in these conditions could move forward, and that lawsuit settled last February. But the Supreme Court had to intervene after an even more conservative court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, attempted to shut down these claims against the prison guards.

A unanimous panel of three Fifth Circuit judges held that it was unclear whether the Constitution prevents prisoners from being forced to remain in “extremely dirty cells for only six days” — although, in what counts as an act of mercy in the Fifth Circuit, the panel did concede that “prisoners couldn’t be housed in cells teeming with human waste for months on end.”

This decision, in Taylor v. Stevens, is hardly aberrant behavior by the Fifth Circuit, which oversees federal litigation arising out of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The Fifth Circuit’s Taylor decision stands out for its casual cruelty, but its disregard for law, precedent, logic, and basic human decency is ordinary behavior in this court.

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Monday, January 2, 2023

New Jersey | Governor Murphy Signs Gun Safety Bill Strengthening Concealed Carry Laws in New Jersey in Response to Bruen Decision

In New York Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. Bruen the Supreme Court, in an iopinion by Clarence Thomas, voided New York States' century old "Taylor law" which required a showing of particularized need for permit to carry a gun.  New Jersey - which had a similar law - responded with Assembly Bill A4769.  
But   the measure does not bar carrying a gun on a New Jersey Transit rail train.  NJTransit is an interstate railroad which carries passengers to and from New York and Pennsylvania.

But the measures could be vulnerable to attack.  In one such challenge in New York John L. Sinatra a federal District Judge in Spencer and His Tabernacle Church v. Nigrelli  enjoined a New York post-Bruen law which made possession of a gun at a religious enterprise .  Sinatra acted at the request of a minister who claimed that "consistent with his religious beliefs" he often carried a concealed firearm during Church services which he conducted as pastor of His Tabernacle Family Church. .

Sinatra simultaneously issued an injunction in favor of a Pastor who in Hardaway v.  Nigrelli embraces the need for self-protection. A.G. Lettia v. 
- GWC 1/2/2023
Office of the Governor | Governor Murphy Signs Gun Safety Bill Strengthening Concealed Carry Laws in New Jersey in Response to Bruen Decision

 Governor Phil Murphy today signed A4769/S3214, delivering on the promise he made in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bruen decision when he unveiled a comprehensive legislative proposal to maintain New Jersey’s status as a model for gun safety by strengthening restrictions for who is eligible for a public carry permit, and establishing a list of places where people with carry permits cannot bring their firearms.

In June, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in  N.Y. State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen  that it is impermissible to require applicants in New York to show “proper cause” to carry a handgun in public, which had the effect of invalidating New Jersey's longstanding laws restricting public carry to those who could demonstrate a "justifiable need". Less than 24 hours later, Governor Murphy unveiled a comprehensive proposal that, consistent with Bruen, would strengthen the statutor y disqualifiers for those eligible for a carry permit, while significantly expanding the list of sensitive places where individuals cannot carry firearms.

“Today’s bill signing is the culmination of months of negotiations between this Administration and our partners in the Legislature, delivering on the promise I made this summer to keep New Jersey safe in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's awful decision,” said Governor Murphy. “While I strongly disagree with that decision, we must abide by it, and today's law fully respects the Second Amendment while keeping guns out of the wrong hands and preventing them from proliferating in our communities. I am proud to sign this commonsense legislation which prohibits carrying guns in sensitive places, including our daycares, hospitals, libraries, and stadiums.”

Under the law signed today, the list of sensitive places where concealed carry is not permissible includes the following three categories (a complete list is included in the law):
High-density locations

  • Entertainment venues, including stadiums, arenas, amusement parks, casinos, racetracks, and publicly owned libraries and museum
  • Youth sporting events and other recreational facilities, such as public parks, beaches, and playground
  • Bars, restaurants where alcohol is served, and any other locations that serve alcohol for on-premises consumption
  • Airports and public transportation hubs


Locations with vulnerable populations

  • Schools, colleges, and universities
  • Daycare and child-care facilities
  • Hospitals and health care facilities
  • Long-term care facilities and nursing homes
  • Correctional facilities, juvenile justice facilities, and halfway houses
  • Homeless shelters


Locations with governmental and First Amendment activity

  • Polling places
  • Courthouses
  • Law enforcement stations and offices
  • Government buildings and locations with government meetings
  • Demonstrations, protests, and licensed public gatherings


In addition to these three categories, this bill sets a default rule that firearms cannot be carried on private property, including homes, businesses, stores, and houses of worship, unless the property owner expressly communicates permission through express consent or specific signage. The only exceptions to these rules are for law enforcement officers or private security guards.

“New Jersey continues to lead the nation in combatting gun violence and demonstrating how commonsense gun laws help keep residents and law enforcement safe,” said Attorney General Platkin. “The legislation signed into law today, strengthens our efforts to keep communities safe by keeping firearms out of the wrong hands and away from sensitive locations, such as where children learn and play. I thank Governor Murphy for taking another strong step forward for gun safety in the wake of recent mass shootings across the country and gun violence here at home. We remain steadfast in protecting New Jerseyans from the epidemic of gun violence while respecting Second Amendment rights.”

In addition to the expanded list of sensitive places, the bill will strengthen permit requirements by expanding ineligibility for a carry permit to the following groups:

  • Persons with an outstanding arrest warrant for an indictable offense;
  • Persons subject to certain restraining orders, including persons who have violated either a temporary or a final restraining order;
  • Persons subject to restraining orders in other jurisdictions;
  • Persons subject to voluntary admissions to mental institutions or hospitals.

The bill also makes for a more vigorous carry permit application process. Applicants must now include four endorsements of character from non-related persons. Upon submission of their application, applicants and their endorsers must now be interviewed by law enforcement to determine whether the applicant is likely to engage in conduct that would result in harm to themselves or others.

Additionally, New Jersey will become the first state in the nation to require all permit carriers to maintain and provide proof of liability insurance with coverage for at least $300,000 on account of injury, death, or damage to property arising out of ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of a firearm.

The bill also increases the handgun permit application fee to $25 from the $2 mark, where it has sat since 1966.