Tuesday, October 27, 2020

Amy Coney Barrett’s Judicial Philosophy Doesn't Hold Up to Scrutiny - Angus King and Heather Richardson The Atlantic

Originalism is club swung crudely.  Like textualism it turns factors into commands.  Due process is a concept that deepened from its origins in the Magna Carta to today.  It cannot be commanded to stop evolving at any particular time...one cannot say this far but no farther for due process nor for equal protection of the laws.  - GWC
Amy Coney Barrett’s Judicial Philosophy Doesn't Hold Up to Scrutiny - The Atlantic
By Angus King (D-ME) and Heather Cox Richardson (Boston College)

To put it bluntly, the whole premise of originalism is nonsense in that it pretends to make the work of the Supreme Court look straightforward and mechanical, like “calling balls and strikes,” in Justice John Roberts’s famous phase. But defining equal protection, due process, or unreasonable is not. We need a Supreme Court to interpret the intent and appropriate application of the terms of the Constitution to particular cases (many not dreamed of by the Framers).

Originalism is an intellectual cloak drummed up (somewhat recently) to dignify a profoundly retrogressive view of the Constitution as a straitjacket on the ability of the federal government to act on behalf of the public. Its real purpose is to justify a return to the legal environment of the early 1930s, when the Court routinely struck down essential elements of the New Deal. Business regulation, Social Security, and Medicare? Not so fast. The Affordable Care Act, environmental protections, a woman’s right to choose? Forget it. And this despite the Constitution’s preamble, which states that one of its basic purposes is to “promote the general welfare.”

This does not mean that the Court should be totally unmoored from the text of the Constitution or the intent of the Framers and act as an unchecked super-legislature (with lifetime tenure to boot). Clearly, this would be inconsistent with the underlying democratic idea that the American people should be the ultimate decision makers through regular elections and the actions of their elected representatives. The Court must interpret and apply the terms of the Constitution according to their plain meaning (where there is a plain meaning) and the understanding and intent of the Framers (where there was such a thing). But it also must recognize that our understanding of our principles and values has expanded over time, and it must interpret the law in the context of that growth.

Monday, October 26, 2020

Eric Topol, MD: there is light ahead on covid19



Eric Topol, M.D. is a superstar at Scripps Institute.  He points a path forward.  Yes - masks, etc. - but there is also great improvement in treatment and prospects for medical advances in treatment and prevention are encouraging.  Follow the thread. - GWC

 

Partial guide to Supreme People’s Court documents | Supreme People's Court Monitor



A terrific resource for finding your way through a key resource. - GWC
Partial guide to Supreme People’s Court documents | Supreme People's Court Monitor
by Susan Finder

Sunday, October 25, 2020

McConnell - spiking the ball?

 Senate Majority Leader McConnell has declared his purpose in such a plain way that it will become an anchoring point in moves to expand the size of the Supreme Court, other federal courts, and otherwise restructure the system, such as to impose fifteen year terms. - gwc



Friday, October 23, 2020

The get rid of Fauci and independent Administrative Judges Executive Order| The White House

 Trump has signed an order exempting from Civil Service protections high ranking career servants like Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director of  the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) And Administrative Law judges who fail to toe the line. - GWC
Executive Order on Creating Schedule F In The Excepted Service | The White House

Thursday, October 22, 2020

Symposium: Shining a light on the shadow docket - SCOTUSblog

 The Supreme Court is creating law by blocking injunctions of courts below - usually without opinion, and without the usual slow deliberative process f cases accepted for review.
Torts Today: Symposium: Shining a light on the shadow docket - SCOTUSblog

Wednesday, October 21, 2020

Justices allow Alabama to restore ban on curbside voting - SCOTUSblog



In Merrill, Alabama Secretary of State v. People First of Alabama  the United States Supreme Court the conservative majority has blocked an injunction that sought to protect voting rights.  Two Alabama Counties - in order to ease obstacles to voting - approved curbside voting.  The state's Secretary of State blocked the decision.  But Abdul K. Kallon, a United States District Judge, on a full record, on September 30 ordered the State to permit the counties to proceed.  The Supreme Court has stayed that order, thus making voting more difficult.  Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who has in a string of cases objected to the Court's early interventions, dissented.  Justices Kagan and Breyer joined her. 

Kallon began his ruling this way:

Voting is an inviolable right, occupying a sacred place in the lives of those who fought to secure the right and in our democracy, because it is “preservative of all rights.”1 The parties do not dispute those fundamental truths. The parties’ dispute centers instead on whether three provisions of Alabama’s election laws—the requirement that a notary or two witnesses sign absentee ballot affidavits, the requirement that absentee voters submit a copy of their photo ID with an absentee ballot application, and the de facto ban on curbside voting2—violate the right to vote in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

 The plaintiffs assert that the defendants’ enforcement of the Challenged Provisions during the pandemic compels voters to risk exposure to COVID-19 in order to exercise their right to vote, leading to potentially deadly consequences for vulnerable voters whose age, race, disabilities, or health conditions place them at heightened risk from the virus. The plaintiffs contend that forcing voters to bear that risk runs afoul of their fundamental right to vote and violates federal law, and they seek an order barring the defendants from enforcing the Challenged Provisions for the general election in November. Without this relief, the plaintiffs believe voters will face an impossible choice between jeopardizing their health by engaging in person-to-person contact they would not otherwise have or sacrificing their right to vote during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Sotomayor wrote:

This stay application arises from the Alabama secretary of state’s decision to ban curbside voting despite the ongoing COVID–19 crisis and the willingness of certain Alabama counties to assist voters with disabilities. Following a lengthy trial and resting on an extensive record, the District Court found, among other things, that the secretary’s ban violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by forcing voters with disabilities, for whom COVID–19 is disproportionately likely to be fatal, to risk unnecessary exposure to the virus if they wish to vote in person. The District Court enjoined the secretary’s ban, thus allowing counties that are ready to adopt curbside voting to do so.  

She concluded:

The injunction lifts burdensome requirements rather than imposing them, and permits county officials to help educate voters about whether curbside voting is available in their county.  Moreover, the injunction neither invalidates state law nor prohibits the secretary from issuing guidance consistent with the District Court’s ruling.  Plaintiff Howard Porter, Jr., a Black man in his seventies with asthma and Parkinson’s Disease, told the District Court: “‘[S]o many of my [ancestors] even died to vote. And while I don’t mind dying to vote, I think we’re past that – we’re past that time.’”   

Election officials in at least Montgomery and Jefferson Counties agree. They are ready and willing to help vulnerable voters like Mr. Porter cast their ballots without unnecessarily risking infection from a deadly virus. This Court should not stand in their way. I respectfully dissent.

****

Article I, Section 4  of the Constitution lays responsibility for organizing elections on the states.  It provides:

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

As is typical when it issues stay orders the Supreme Court majority does so without opinion.  We learn therefore from the occasional dissenting opinion how the majority may have reached its conclusion.  It may be inferred that  the heart of the rationale is that a federal court should not intervene in state's management of its election procedures at a time close to the election.  This is commonly called the Purcell principle.

One must ask - what are the interests that drive such a ruling?  Is it the business of the United States courts to maximize or ease the path to voting?  Or is the court properly limited by the Constitution to stand off?  Is the convenience of persons with disabilities affecting ability to stand or walk a relevant consideration?  If a state decides that assuring the security and reliability of the election is more important than easing the burdens of voting is there any ground for the federal government to intervene in such a judgment?  Is there any relevance of the Fifteenth Amendment to analysis of the burdens of notarized ballots, and limiting the places and methods by which votes may be cast?  The 15th Amendment provides "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."  In the absence of proof of discriminatory intent does the Amendment count for anything?  Should disparate impact be enough ground to act? Is the tortured history of Alabama's constitutional efforts to suppress the African American vote relevant?

Are the considerations different in immigration cases?  In Wolf v. Cook County, Illinois the Supreme Court stayed an order - upheld by the 7th Circuit [over an Amy Coney Barrett dissent] which blocked enforcement of the public charge rule which bars from immigration anyone whom the government thinks may at some point claim public benefits such as for medicaid.  Is  deference to Executive branch policy choices an appropriate stance for a court to embrace? 

In Wolf the court begins it's opinion by saying 

Like most people, immigrants to the United States would like greater prosperity for themselves and their families. Nonetheless, it can take time to achieve the American Dream, and the path is not always smooth. Recognizing this, Congress has chosen to make immigrants eligible for various public benefits; state and local governments have done the same.

 Is it improper for a court - perhaps out of personal sympathies - reject such a rule as inconsistent with the Asylum law, and a tradition of welcoming as refugees people suffering from climate disasters [Haiti], anti-semitism [Russian Jews], or dictatorship [Cuba]?


- GWC

by Amy Howe

Francis becomes 1st pope to endorse same-sex civil unions

Francis becomes 1st pope to endorse same-sex civil unions
 

Dorf on Law: Confronting Originalism: Truths and Myths

An accessible and lucid survey by Professor Segall with helpful links on how originalism (viz. Amy Coney Barrett) has become a signal, not a method of analysis. - gwc
Dorf on Law: Confronting Originalism: Truths and Myths
by Eric Segall
"in 2020, the most important truth about Originalism is that it is no longer a distinctive theory of constitutional interpretation but a signifier of and justification for conservative or libertarian politics. And this shouldn't be surprising because, after all, law is politics 90% of the way down."

Sunday, October 18, 2020

Almost the whole country is in the "Uncontrolled Spread" category - Eric Topol, MD - Scripps Institute

 Yesterday: US. 69 K new covid cases reported Germany 5K Italy 11K UK 16K China 13 NZ 0

Saturday, October 17, 2020

Michigan: Trump, crowd chant "Lock 'em up"

 

Gunmen in the legislative chamber - Michigan May 2020
When gunmen massed in the Michigan State Capitol we asked Is it sedition?
Last week plotters to kidnap Governor Whitmer were indicted.  Trump's response? 
Incite his crowd to lock up the Governor, not the plotters. - gwc

Friday, October 16, 2020

Dr. Tom Frieden herd stupidity - a bad week

 

First Things - False Choices - Hiroshima and Nagasaki | Commonweal Magazine

George Weigel the editor of First things - house organ of the intellectual sky writers of the Catholic right - is appalled by abortion and moral relativism, but good with incinerating Japanese cities.  How does one go from absolutism to relativism in that way? - gwc
False Choices | Commonweal Magazine
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unjustifiable.

Atrain is hurtling down the tracks. Ahead of it lies a group of five people, tied to the tracks and unable to escape. The only way to save their lives is to switch the train onto a different track—a track on which only a single person is tied down. You stand at the lever that can switch the train. No one else is around. No other options are available to you. What should you do? Kill the one to save the five, or let the five die because you refuse to kill the one?
For the past fifty years, scenarios like this one have played an outsized role in popular and academic discussions of moral decision-making. Such discussions are not, perhaps, without some value. But one of their bad effects is the way they invite us to conceive of the moral life as a series of decontextualized choices between strictly fixed options, with the outcome of each one guaranteed in advance. Kill the one or the five will die. Torture the terrorist suspect or the plane will be hijacked. Lie to the Nazi soldiers or he will certainly find the Jews who are hidden in your basement. What’s missing is the role of creative practical thinking—what the scholastics called prudentia—in considering the possibilities and determining how to act. Also missing, the importance of reflection on how we got here—what the decisions are that we and others made to land us in a morally challenging situation. Here I am, standing alone at a lever in a railyard, the lone person responsible for the lives of five captive people…well, what in the world can have happened to me? Did I get involved with a bad set, perhaps? Isn’t this a thing we ought to be thinking about, if we want to think about how a person ought to live?
When moral life is conceived of as a series of fixed choices, each of which arises in what might as well be a vacuum, a natural response is to evaluate those choices simply in terms of the number of people affected: in every case, the correct thing to do is the thing that will minimize suffering. This response is natural, but not inevitable. We can and must consider not only the consequences of our possible actions, but also those fixed principles that rule certain options out no matter the situation we are in. It is precisely for this reason that prudence is so essential. Such is the consistent teaching of the Church through its history: that one must never do evil—not even to avoid a seemingly greater evil or achieve a very great good. The teaching can be a difficult one. Sometimes it calls for great sacrifice. But the Christian’s commitment to it is rooted in our confidence that the world is in the hands of a loving and provident God, whose commands are just and ordained to our own happiness. This, again, is the unbroken teaching of our Church. And it is hard to see its rationale when we allow the moral life to be construed in the way that we have just described, as a series of fixed choices that may as well have no history or wider context.

What’s missing is the role of creative practical thinking in considering the possibilities and determining how to act.
All these mistakes are on display in George Weigel’s recent attempt, online at First Things, to defend Harry Truman’s bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is the framing of Truman’s choice as between a totally fixed set of options: to firebomb Japanese cities, to starve the Japanese by blockade, or to use atomic weapons in an effort to “stun Japanese politicians” into capitulation. Nothing else could be done. There is the certainty that, in each case, we knew exactly what the outcome of a given choice would be. The choice saved lives. 

147,000 prisoners hit by Coronavirus | The Marshall Project

A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons | The Marshall Project
By Oct. 15, at least 147,051 people in prison had tested positive for the illness, a 3 percent increase from the week before. This was the lowest weekly increase among prisoners since June. The numbers suggest infections are slowing in prisons, while the rest of the nation on the outside starts to observe rising numbers of new cases as autumn sets in.
New cases among prisoners reached an all-time high in early August after slowing down in June, driven by big jumps in prisoners testing positive in Florida, California and the federal Bureau of Prisons as well as outbreaks in Arkansas, Hawaii and Oklahoma.
Reported cases first peaked in late April, when states such as Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee and Texas began mass testing of prisoners. Those initiatives suggested that coronavirus had been circulating among people without symptoms in much greater numbers than previously known.
There have been at least147,051 casesof coronavirus reported among prisoners.
122,751 prisoners have recovered.

Sen. Harris presses Barrett on anti-labor record

Thursday, October 15, 2020

Opinion | Republican Judges Are Quietly Upending Public Health Laws - The New York Times

Opinion | Republican Judges Are Quietly Upending Public Health Laws - The New York Times
By John Fabian Witt
Alongside growing controversy over judicial nominations, court reform and Covid-19 policies, American law is in the midst of a little-noticed paradigm shift in courts’ treatment of public health measures.
The Republican Party’s campaign to take over the federal and state courts is quietly upending a long and deeply embedded tradition of upholding vital public health regulations. The result has been a radically novel and potentially catastrophic sequence of decisions blocking state responses to the coronavirus pandemic.
For centuries, American constitutional law granted state governments broad public health powers. “Salus populi suprema lex,” the old saying went: The health of the people is the supreme law. Such authority went back to the beginning of the Republic. In the famous 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall defended the “acknowledged power of a State to provide for the health of its citizens.” States, he explained, were empowered to enact “inspection laws, quarantine laws” and “health laws of every description.”
Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts, who was arguably the most respected state judge of the 19th century, supported vast public health powers and described states’ authority to control epidemics as central to the sovereign power of government. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, citing the old dictum of salus populi, and courts in states like Georgia and Louisiana followed. In New York, the state’s highest court upheld disruptive health regulations like a ban on burials in urban church cemeteries. After the Civil War, New York’s courts upheld the Legislature’s decision to vest local boards with “absolute control over persons and property, so far as the public health was concerned.”***

Inside the Fall of the CDC — ProPublica

Inside the Fall of the CDC — ProPublica

ProPublica is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up to receive our biggest stories as soon as they’re published.
At 7:47 a.m. on the Sunday of Memorial Day weekend, Dr. Jay Butler pounded out a grim email to colleagues at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta.
Butler, then the head of the agency’s coronavirus response, and his team had been trying to craft guidance to help Americans return safely to worship amid worries that two of its greatest comforts — the chanting of prayers and singing of hymns — could launch a deadly virus into the air with each breath.
The week before, the CDC had published its investigation of an outbreak at an Arkansas church that had resulted in four deaths. The agency’s scientific journal recently had detailed a superspreader event in which 52 of the 61 singers at a 2½-hour choir practice developed COVID-19. Two died.
Butler, an infectious disease specialist with more than three decades of experience, seemed the ideal person to lead the effort. Trained as one of the CDC’s elite disease detectives, he’d helped the FBI investigate the anthrax attacks, and he’d led the distribution of vaccines during the H1N1 flu pandemic when demand far outstripped supply.
But days earlier, Butler and his team had suddenly found themselves on President Donald Trump’s front burner when the president began publicly agitating for churches to reopen. That Thursday, Trump had announced that the CDC would release safety guidelines for them “very soon.” He accused Democratic governors of disrespecting churches, and deemed houses of worship “essential services.”
Butler’s team rushed to finalize the guidance for churches, synagogues and mosques that Trump’s aides had shelved in April after battling the CDC over the language. In reviewing a raft of last-minute edits from the White House, Butler’s team rejected those that conflicted with CDC research, including a worrisome suggestion to delete a line that urged congregations to “consider suspending or at least decreasing” the use of choirs.
On Friday, Trump’s aides called the CDC repeatedly about the guidance, according to emails. “Why is it not up?” they demanded until it was posted on the CDC website that afternoon.
The next day, a furious call came from the office of the vice president: The White House suggestions were not optional. The CDC’s failure to use them was insubordinate, according to emails at the time.
Fifteen minutes later, one of Butler’s deputies had the agency’s text replaced with the White House version, the emails show. The danger of singing wasn’t mentioned.
Early that Sunday morning, as Americans across the country prepared excitedly to return to houses of worship, Butler, a churchgoer himself, poured his anguish and anger into an email to a few colleagues.
“I am very troubled on this Sunday morning that there will be people who will get sick and perhaps die because of what we were forced to do,” he wrote.
When the next history of the CDC is written, 2020 will emerge as perhaps the darkest chapter in its 74 years, rivaled only by its involvement in the infamous Tuskegee experiment, in which federal doctors withheld medicine from poor Black men with syphilis, then tracked their descent into blindness, insanity and death.
With more than 216,000 people dead this year, most Americans know the low points of the current chapter already. A vaunted agency that was once the global gold standard of public health has, with breathtaking speed, become a target of anger, scorn and even pity.
How could an agency that eradicated smallpox globally and wiped out polio in the United States have fallen so far?

John Snow appeal: Epidemiologists warn on "herd immunity" call for social controls

 

Scientific consensus on the COVID-19 pandemic: we need to act now - The Lancet

Scientific consensus on the COVID-19 pandemic: we need to act now - The Lancet

eLECTION LAW: Freeing Purcell from the Shadows | Take Care

Torts Today: Freeing Purcell from the Shadows | Take Care

Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett’s originalist approach to the Constitution, explained - Vox

Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett’s originalist approach to the Constitution, explained - Vox
By Ian Millhiser
Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings begin on Monday, and it’s a safe bet that we’ll hear one word over and over again over the next few days: “originalism.” Barrett is a self-proclaimed originalist, embracing a theory of the Constitution that is also shared by at least two other sitting justices: Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch.
Originalism, in Barrett’s words, is the belief that “constitutional text means what it did at the time it was ratified and that this original public meaning is authoritative.” Judges, originalists maintain, should be bound by the words of the Constitution, and the meaning of those words should be determined solely based on how they were understood when they were added to the Constitution.
One of the primary appeals of originalism is that it purports to constrain judges by requiring them to follow a written text even when they dislike the outcomes that text commands. “The main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution,” Justice Antonin Scalia said in a 1988 lecture explaining why he is an originalist, “is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”
At least in theory, originalism prevents judges from making this mistake by lashing them to the unchanging meaning of a written document. And, at least on the surface, its core insight that judges are bound by the Constitution’s words seems obvious: Of course judges should obey the text of the Constitution!
In reality, however, following the text of the Constitution is more complicated than it sounds.
The Hart Senate Office Building Room is set up for the confirmation hearing of Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett.
 Caroline Brehman/CQ-Roll Call/Getty Images
For one thing, the Constitution is riddled with ambiguous language. What are the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”? What makes a search or seizure “unreasonable”? If the government wants to deny “liberty,” how much “process” is “due”? What’s a “public use” of private property? What is the “general welfare of the United States”?
The meaning of much of the Constitution is vague and uncertain, and it was vague and uncertain when it was drafted. There are limits to what a judge can learn about constitutional meaning by combing through historical documents, or by reading 18th-century dictionaries.
Barrett herself seems to acknowledge this problem. “For an originalist,” Barrett wrote in 2017, “the meaning of the text is fixed so long as it is discoverable.”

Tuesday, October 13, 2020

"n-word' doesn't make workplace hostile - Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s notable opinions, votes

Amy Barrett is a devotee of the stiff upper lip school it seems. 
Just let the insults roll off you.  - GWC
A look at Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s notable opinions, votes
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
Barrett wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel in 2019 that upheld the dismissal of a workplace discrimination lawsuit by Terry Smith, a Black Illinois transportation employee who sued after he was fired. Smith’s claims included that he was called a racial slur by supervisor Lloyd Colbert.
“The n-word is an egregious racial epithet,” Barrett wrote in Smith v. Illinois Department of Transportation. “That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving that the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that Colbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his employment and created a hostile or abusive working environment.”
Barrett went on to say that Smith “introduced no evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his subjective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified that his time at the Department caused him psychological distress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with Colbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the Department was rocky from the outset because of his poor track record.”
A possible colleague of Barrett’s took a different view on racial slurs in 2013. Justice Brett Kavanaugh, then serving as a federal appeals court judge in Washington, D.C, said one utterance was enough. “But, in my view, being called the n-word by a supervisor ... suffices by itself to establish a racially hostile work environment. That epithet has been labeled, variously, a term that ‘sums up . . . all the bitter years of insult and struggle in America,’ ‘pure anathema to African-Americans,’ and ’probably the most offensive word in English,” Kavanaugh wrote. “No other word in the English language so powerfully or instantly calls to mind our country’s long and brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination against African-Americans. In short, the case law demonstrates that a single, sufficiently severe incident may create a hostile work environment actionable” under federal anti-discrimination laws.

Fifth Circuit Upholds Single Ballot Drop Off Box for Houston

The Fifth Circuit has upheld Texas Governor Greg Abbott's order limiting ballot drop off boxes to a single box per county.  That is one box for the entire 2.3 million people of Houston, Harris County Texas.  Yet because early voting is an expansion of the right to vote beyond a single election day the limitation of drop off boxes to a single location in each of the hundreds of Texas counties - many sparsely populated, unlike Houston, the nation's fourth largest city. - GWC
Texas United League of Latin American Citizens
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
"To be sure, the proclamation requires a single designated drop-off location per county during the expanded forty-day period. But that represents merely a partial refinement of the bounds of a still-existing expansion of absentee voting opportunities. In a related context, we have recently explained that to “abridg[e]” the right to vote means to “place a barrier or prerequisite to voting, or otherwise make it more difficult to vote.” Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 5422917, at *15 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2020)(TDP II). By contrast, “a law that makes it easier for others to vote does not abridge any person’s right to vote.” Id. The July 27 and October 1 Proclamations— which must be read together to make sense—are beyond any doubt measures that “make[] it easier” for eligible Texans to vote absentee. Id. How this expansion of voting opportunities burdens anyone’s right to vote is a mystery."

Amy Coney Barrett character: She's as cynical as Trump.

Amy Coney Barrett character: She's as cynical as Trump.

Monday, October 12, 2020

Why Amy Coney Barrett Should Not Be On The Supreme Court ❧ Current Affairs

Why Amy Coney Barrett Should Not Be On The Supreme Court ❧ Current Affairs
by Nathan J. Robinson
I do not care about Amy Coney Barrett’s membership in the “People of Praise.” I am uninterested in her religion or her family life. I am not even terribly interested in her credentials, e.g., whether she did a prestigious clerkship, or published a bunch of academic articles, or got good course evaluations as a law professor. One question alone matters to me: what effects would her presence of the Supreme Court have? In other words: how would she rule on issues that matter? Who would be helped or hurt by these rulings? The most important criteria in evaluating a potential justice are their stated values and their prior record, because these are the best evidence we have with which to speculate about what they would do if placed on the nation’s highest court.
In the case of Amy Coney Barrett, an examination of her judicial opinions and public statements reveals a straightforward conclusion: she should not be placed on the Supreme Court, and everyone should oppose her confirmation. On the Court, she is likely to issue rulings that cause significant needless harm to innocent people and make the country a more unjust place, with rulings that erode the rights of workers, immigrants, criminal defendants, and, of course, those who need abortions. Sometimes her opinions have been downright cruel. They disqualify her, full stop.
Let’s begin with an immigration case, one that shows very well how Barrett will undermine basic constitutional rights. Mohsin Yafai is a United States citizen whose wife, Zahoor Ahmed, is a citizen of Yemen. Yafai and Ahmed wanted to live together in the United States, so Ahmed and her children applied (using the correct legal process) for visas. The consular office denied Ahmed’s application on the grounds that she had “attempted to smuggle two children into the United States using the identities Yaqub Mohsin Yafai and Khaled Mohsin Yafai.” It’s not clear why the consular officer believed Ahmed was attempting to “smuggle” children (no evidence was provided to the family), but apparently the consular officer thought the children Ahmed had applied for visas for were not actually her children. In any case, the children, Yaqub and Khaled, had tragically drowned while the applications were pending. Yafai and Ahmed then submitted a large amount of evidence to the consulate, including “vaccination records for the deceased children, school records for the older deceased child, prenatal care and ultrasound records, publications concerning the drowning, a passport for the older deceased child, and complete family photos prior to the children’s deaths.” But the U.S. simply affirmed its existing visa denial, meaning that Mohsin (again, a citizen of this country) could not live here with his wife, Zahoor. The two took the matter to the courts.
Here is where Amy Coney Barrett comes in: she threw out the couple’s case. Writing for two judges on a three-judge panel, she said that it didn’t matter whether the accusation was based on no evidence. It didn’t matter whether Zahood Ahmed provided giant piles of counterevidence showing that the visa denial had been a mistake, and that she had fulfilled the legal requirements to come to the U.S. to live with her husband. It didn’t matter if the officer had just made the smuggling stuff up out of whole cloth. Barrett wrote that because the consular officer had cited a statute (the anti-smuggling one) in denying the visa, the decision was “facially legitimate and bona fide,” and therefore would not be reviewed by the court. 
The third judge on the panel, Kenneth Ripple (a Reagan appointee), strongly dissented from Barrett’s judgment. The decision, Ripple said, showed “no respect for the Constitution or Congress” because it meant that the government could simply arbitrarily deny visas to people fully legally qualified for them, who had gone through the correct process and done everything right. And the government could do this based on vague accusations for which it provided no support, and without even pretending to review the applicant’s own evidence disproving the accusation. Under such a standard the law would become (even more of) an utterly meaningless fiction, because one’s rights could simply be trampled upon without it being possible to do anything about it. Ripple wrote: 
Here, in a case where the Government asserts no national security interest and where the important familial rights of an American citizen are at stake, the Government asks us to rubber stamp the consular decision on the basis of a conclusory [a legal term meaning “stated as a fact without being proven”] assertion. Although Congress has tasked us, by statute, with the responsibility to prevent arbitrary and capricious government action, we look the other way despite the significant record evidence to refute the Government’s assertion and no suggestion that the consular officer even considered it. Congress did not, and would not, sanction consular officers’ making visa decisions in a purely arbitrary way that affects the basic rights of American citizens. We have the responsibility to ensure that such decisions, when born of laziness, prejudice or bureaucratic inertia, do not stand.
Barrett did not have to do this. Even the anti-immigration Center for Immigration Studies acknowledges that this area of law is “nowhere near settled.” Barrett made a choice to empower the government and disempower immigrants (and, remember, immigrants who follow the law to the letter). Ripple wasn’t the only one of Barrett’s fellow appellate judges to take her to task. In a dissent to an opinion denying Yafai and Ahmed a rehearing, judge Diane Wood (joined by Ilana Rovner and David Hamilton) called the ruling “a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility” and “a deeply troubling extension of current law” because it “insulat[es the officer] from any shred of accountability.” Wood wrote: 
At its root, due process requires that the person subject to a governmental action be given enough information to be able to know what the accusation against her is. A regime in which the consular official can just say“no,” and the US citizen spouse must guess both about the accusation that supposedly supported that decision and—critically—what facts lay behind the “no,” is not worthy of this country.
Judges are usually collegial types, so for one of them to call a decision “unworthy of this country” is a strong statement indeed. But it was necessary, because the implications of Barrett’s majority opinion so seriously threaten people’s basic legal protections.

Barrett's theology may be out of bounds, but not her judicial philosophy | National Catholic Reporter

Barrett's theology may be out of bounds, but not her judicial philosophy | National Catholic Reporter
by Michael Sean Winters
***My objection to confirming Barrett remains her judicial philosophy, specifically her commitment to textualism, a kissin' cousin of the originalism espoused by her hero Justice Antonin Scalia, for whom she clerked. She defined textualism in a 2010 Boston University Law Review article:
The defining tenet of textualism is the belief that it is impossible to know whether Congress would have drafted the statute differently if it had anticipated the situation before the court. The legislative process is path-dependent and riddled with compromise. A statute's language may be at odds with its broad purpose because proponents accept less than they want in order to secure the bill's passage. The language may appear awkward because competing factions agree "to split the difference between competing principles." To respect the deals that are inevitably struck along the way, the outcome of this complex process — the statutory text — must control. A judge who reshapes statutory language to alleviate its awkwardness risks undoing the very bargains that made the statute's passage possible.
The problem with textualism, then, is not that it holds that the text is essentially self-interpreting, that the meaning of the words is fixed, even though the meanings of words are never fixed. The deeper problem is that textualists present their theory in such simplistic ways for popular consumption — who wants a judge who undermines the text of the Constitution? — but in fact the reasonings they apply are just as complicated and open to personal adjustment as those deployed by the court's liberals.