SCOTS OKs Trump's mass layoffs without Congressional consent

 Ketanji Brown Jackson brings her trial court and Circuit judge experience to this lucid and plain spoken dissent from the majority decision freeing President Trump to unilaterally make steep cuts in the federal workforce,  bypassing Congress which appropriated the funds to pay the staff. ~ GWC 

No. 24A1174 Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, ET AL. 

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY 

Justice Brown-Jackson - dissenting:

Historical practice thus confirms that, while Presidents possess some discretion to reduce federal employment, they may not fundamentally restructure the Federal Government all on their own. Administrative agencies are created by statute and funded by Congress; therefore, Presidents have traditionally worked with Congress to effect significant alterations of those statutory structures. This history is crucial to understand, because it establishes the “status quo” when it comes to the relative roles of Congress and the [President]...

The Court has now stayed the District Court’s preliminary injunction—authorizing implementation of Executive Order No. 14210, and all the harmful upheaval that edict entails, while the lower courts evaluate its lawfulness. In my view, this was the wrong decision at the wrong moment, especially given what little this Court knows about what is actually happening on the ground. To be specific: What is at issue here is whether Executive Order No. 14210 effects a massive restructuring of the Federal Government (the likes of which have historically required Congress’s approval), on the one hand, or minor workforce reductions consistent with existing law, on the other. One needs facts to answer that critical question, and the District Court not only issued such preliminary findings based on actual evidence, it is also the tribunal best positioned to make that determination, at least initially. Put differently, from its lofty perch far from the facts or the evidence, this Court lacks the capacity to fully evaluate, much less responsibly override, reasoned lower court factfinding about what this challenged executive action actually entails. I respectfully dissent because, in addition to the Government’s failure to show the exigency or irreparable harm that is required for emergency relief, this Court could not possibly know in this posture whether the Government is likely to succeed on the merits with respect to such a fact dependent dispute. So it should have left well enough alone.