President Biden - The next six months - The White House

Statement of President Biden, July 24, 2024  VIDEO

 

Supreme Myths: Immunity? Professor Jed Shugerman Podcast with Eric Segall

Supreme Myths: Professor Jed Shugerman on Apple Podcasts

Presidential power expert Professor Jed Shugerman stops by Supreme Myths to talk Presidential Immunity, Section 3 Disqualification, Chevron, and how Originalism should work in separation of powers cases.

Conversation with Georgia  State University law Prof. Eric Segall  54 minutes

Biden oval office: time for younger leadership

https://youtu.be/93T8biDlaBc

United States v. Nixon at Fifty: Why Judge Cannon Is Wrong About the Attorney General’s Authority to Select a Special Counsel

Judge Aileen Cannon

United States v. Nixon at Fifty: Why Judge Cannon Is Wrong About the Attorney General’s Authority to Select a Special Counsel

By Marty Lederman 

  (@marty_lederman)  is a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center.  He was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel from 2021-2023 and 2009-2010, and an Attorney Advisor in OLC from 1994-2002.

Fifty years ago today, the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in United States v. Nixon. Nixon involved the constitutionality of a subpoena for tapes that District Judge John Sirica issued to the sitting President at the behest of Leon Jaworski, a “special prosecutor” who had an unprecedented degree of independence from DOJ leadership (and from the President). Jaworski was appointed to his position by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork. (Indeed, Bork separately created the office that he appointed Jaworski to fill, as I explain below.) In the course of his opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger held that Congress had vested the Attorney General with the power to make such a delegation of authority to the special prosecutor. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 & n.8 (1974). As I discuss at the end of this essay, that was not a controversial position at the time—indeed, even President Richard Nixon himself, represented by esteemed counsel, concurred that the Acting Attorney General had such statutory authority, and no one in Congress or the legal community (to my knowledge) suggested otherwise.

For almost a half-century thereafter, the Supreme Court’s conclusion about the Attorney General’s authority became common, uncontradicted wisdom. No one in any of the three branches of government ever questioned it, and Attorneys General repeatedly acted in accord with, and reliance upon, it.

Until last Monday. On July 15, U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon concluded that the Supreme Court was wrong about the Attorney General’s authority. And on the basis of that holding, Judge Cannon granted former President Donald Trump’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him in the Mar-a-Lago retained-documents case.

This essay explains why the Supreme Court (and virtually everyone else for 50 years) was right about the Attorney General’s authority and why Judge Cannon therefore erred in dismissing the indictment.

KEEP READING

 [Disclosure: I, Marty Lederman, was a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel at the time of the Attorney General’s appointment of Jack Smith as Special Counsel. Nothing in this essay, however, reflects any confidential information from my tenure at OLC.]

What’s Going On in Footnote 3? | A narrow path to convict Trump? Lawfare

What’s Going On in Footnote 3? | Lawfare

 

By Anna Bower and Benjamin Wittes//Lawfare Tuesday, July 23, 2024

In retrospect, the most consequential part of the oral argument in Trump v. United States—or “the presidential immunity case”—took place early in what became a marathon hearing. Chief Justice John Roberts posed what seemed like a skeptical hypothetical to Donald Trump’s lawyer, a man named D. John Sauer.

“Well, what if you have—let’s say the official act is appointing ambassadors, and the president appoints a particular individual to a country, but it’s in exchange for a bribe. Somebody says, I’ll give you a million dollars if I’m made the ambassador to whatever. How do you analyze that?”

Sauer argued in response that bribery is not an official act, so there would be no immunity in that case, but the chief justice wasn’t quite ready to let go of his question. “Accepting a bribe isn’t an official act,” he agreed, “but appointing an ambassador is certainly within the official responsibilities of the president. So how ... does your official acts ... boundary come into play?”

Analogizing the question to cases under the Speech and Debate Clause, which immunizes legislators for official legislative acts, Sauer responded that “the indictment has to be expunged of all the immune official acts, so there has to be a determination what’s official [and] what’s not official.”

Roberts, quite understandably, found this unsatisfying: “Well, you expunge the official. You say, okay, we’re prosecuting you because you accepted a million dollars. They’re supposed to ... not say what it’s for because the what-it’s-for part is within the president’s official duties?”

Sauer, like a good appellate advocate, skated over Roberts’s question, saying that “[t]here has to be, we would say, an independent source of evidence for that.” And then he whisked the conversation onto safer ground, talking about how the Jan. 6 indictment strikes at the “heartland of presidential power.”

The issue of whether official acts immunity would prevent prosecution of a former president for bribery by preventing inquiry into the official act he committed in exchange for the thing of value comes up several more times at oral argument. And it comes up in the court’s opinion too—although this time with a bit of a role reversal. In the opinion, it’s Justice Amy Coney Barrett who objects that the court’s ruling would preclude a bribery prosecution, and it’s Chief Justice Roberts—having adopted the role of Sauer—who cryptically suggests that prosecutors might use some extrinsic piece of evidence of an official presidential act and then hastily moves on to another subject.

The matter is important in both doctrinal and practical terms. In doctrinal terms, the exchange between Barrett and Roberts reveals one of the weakest aspects of the majority’s opinion—one that Roberts appears to understand, given that he probed Sauer on exactly the same point at oral argument. In practical terms, the matter is important because it might—and we must stress might—open up a loophole in the Court’s opinion that Special Counsel Jack Smith could exploit on remand to one degree or another.

Luttig and Katyal on Presidential Immunity - video - Kettering Foundation

 

Presidential Immunity and Democratic Disorder Cass R. Sunstein

 

With his usual clarity - which leaves you with "of course, why didn't I think of that" -  Cass Sunstein deconstructs and - to my view - dismantles the opinion by John Roberts for a 6-3 majority in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce  The right-wing justices effectively immunized Donald Trump from prosecution for his incitement of the riot on January 6, 2021 which obstructed the ordinary, peaceful transfer of power.

Sunstein asks Does some provision of the Constitution give the President unquestionable power, such that neither Congress nor courts may intrude on it?

For Roberts and the Trump-bolstered majority the answer is Yes.  But when the originalists search the text they come up dry.  So they construct a structural argument based on the consequentialist surmise that if one President is allowed to order the prosecution of his or her predecessor, then every successor would live in fear of their successor.  And the exercise of Presidential power would be obstructed.  Got it? So their solution is absolute immunity for core functions and presumptive immunity for others.

Sunstein turns to the estimable Robert Jackson's opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Steel Tube , 343 U.S. 579 (1952) which upheld .  There the great Justice and war crimes prosecutor deploys a tri-partite scheme for review of exercises of presidential authority.  When it acts contrary to Congress that power is at its lowest ebb:

When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will

of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own

constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the

matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by

disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power

at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is

at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.

In Roberts view:

when the President’s authority is granted by the Constitution, it is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.”If so, neither Congress nor the courts can control the President’s authority and discretion: “once it is determined that the President acted within the scope of his exclusive authority, his discretion in exercising such authority cannot be subject to further judicial examination.” 

So when Trump met with his acting justice Department leaders and others to plan his attack on the reported results of an election he lost he was clothed with "absolute immunity".  The ordinary criminal law is preempted.

Sunstein concludes

For those who insist on fidelity to the legal sources, the most charitable verdict on

Trump v. United States is Scottish: Not proven. For those who are favorably disposed

toward judicial statesmanship, a degree of skepticism is also in order. The parade of

horribles, signaled by the idea of a self-cannibalizing executive branch, is met by another

(and worse) parade of horribles, signaled by an immensely powerful President who is, for

the first time in U.S history, broadly free from the operations of criminal law.    

Preliminary draft 7/16/24

All rights reserved

Presidential Immunity and Democratic Disorder   

By Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract

Before Trump v. United States, issues of presidential immunity were generally

analyzed by reference to the following question: Would subjecting the President

to a legal proceeding compromise his ability to perform his constitutional

functions? After Trump v. United States, the immunity issue is analyzed, in

significant part, by reference to an altogether different question: Does some

provision of the Constitution give the President unquestionable power, such

that neither Congress nor courts may intrude on it? It is imaginable that the

second question is the right one, but the Court’s analysis is brisk and conclusory; it

does not seriously engage with the standard sources of constitutional

interpretation. For example, there is no real effort to show that the Court’s various

conclusions follow from text or the original public meaning. That is a puzzle. Part of

the explanation for the new framework may lie in a single sentence, pointing to “the

prospect of an Executive Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive

President free to prosecute his predecessors, yet unable to boldly and fearlessly

carry out his duties for fear that he may be next.” This pragmatic concern might

provide the motivation for some of the Court’s momentous constitutional

conclusions. It links Trump v. United States with a variety of other decisions,

including Bush v. Gore and Trump v. Colorado, that also seem concerned with the

problem of democratic disorder – a kind of Representation Reinforcement 2.0 (or is

it 1.0?). For those who insist on fidelity to legal sources, the most charitable verdict

on Trump v. United States is Scottish: Not proven.

Sunstein, Cass R., Presidential Immunity and Democratic Disorder (July 16, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4896559 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4896559

Congress in post Chevron world - Prof. Josh Chafetz Testimony

 Judges have always been expected to apply their “judgment” independent of the political branches when interpreting the laws those branches enact. The Federalist No. 78, at 523. And one of those laws, the APA, bars judges from disregarding that responsibility just because an Executive Branch agency views a statute differently. Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.

John Roberts for the majority in Loper Bright v.  Raimondo (2024)

“Congress in a Post-Chevron World”

Hearing Before the Committee on House Administration

Tuesday, July 23, 2024, 10:15 AM

Testimony of Josh Chafetz

Georgetown University Law Center

Agnes Williams Sesquicentennial Professor of Law and Politics

 

Chairman Steil, Ranking Member Morelle, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the vitally important topic of

congressional responses to the Supreme Court’s recent Loper Bright decision. My name is Josh

Chafetz, and I am the Agnes Williams Sesquicentennial Professor of Law and Politics at

Georgetown University Law Center and an Affiliated Faculty Member of both the Government

Department and the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown. My research and teaching

focus on legislative procedure, the separation of powers, and the constitutional structuring of

American national politics.

The Loper Bright decision purports to empower Congress, but in fact partakes of a larger program of judicial self-aggrandizement at the expense of both Congress and the agencies. Potential congressional responses include both changes to statutory drafting and increases in congressional capacity. These responses would be salutary, but they are not sufficient. At the end of the day, the Supreme Court’s anti-administrativist bent is a major obstacle to public policymaking, and it will remain so until the Court either is reined in or changes its tune.

On President Biden’s Announcement | by Barack Obama | Jul, 2024 | Medium

My Statement on President Biden’s Announcement | by Barack Obama | July 21, 2024 | Medium

Joe Biden has been one of America’s most consequential presidents, as well as a dear friend and partner to me. Today, we’ve also been reminded — again — that he’s a patriot of the highest order.

Sixteen years ago, when I began my search for a vice president, I knew about Joe’s remarkable career in public service. But what I came to admire even more was his character — his deep empathy and hard-earned resilience; his fundamental decency and belief that everyone counts.

Since taking office, President Biden has displayed that character again and again. He helped end the pandemic, created millions of jobs, lowered the cost of prescription drugs, passed the first major piece of gun safety legislation in 30 years, made the biggest investment to address climate change in history, and fought to ensure the rights of working people to organize for fair wages and benefits. Internationally, he restored America’s standing in the world, revitalized NATO, and mobilized the world to stand up against Russian aggression in Ukraine.

More than that, President Biden pointed us away from the four years of chaos, falsehood, and division that had characterized Donald Trump’s administration. Through his policies and his example, Joe has reminded us of who we are at our best — a country committed to old-fashioned values like trust and honesty, kindness and hard work; a country that believes in democracy, rule of law, and accountability; a country that insists that everyone, no matter who they are, has a voice and deserves a chance at a better life.

An honorable man - Joe Biden steps back.

 

I am grateful for all you have done as a man of integrity and compassion, a father and husband, United States Senator, Vice President and President. I am sure you will lead the fight for an honorable peace in Israel and Palestine, and to defeat aggression in the Ukraine. Thanks.

Markowitz: occupational health

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/w3llg17yrb7r6vk3mhsm6/A_Short_History_of_Occupational_Safety_a.pdf?rlkey=ivyy73xm12qvfmxum0n5wrx46&dl=0

Israel illegal conduct occupied territories ICJ

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/p8wh2fg6eq476hkhxyykx/186-20240712-pre-01-00-en.pdf?rlkey=m3uj9f6t40ygxpyv8mvxi6wno&dl=0

Congressman Jamie Raskin's letter to President Biden

 Congressman Jamie Raskin's letter to President Joe Biden  (<<<<full text, 4 pages, excerpted below)

July 6, 2024 

Dear President Biden: 

I write as your admirer, your supporter and your fellow politician. I write also as your friend who has treasured your compassion and wisdom... But I write you now, above all, as a fellow citizen who shares your mad love for American democracy  and freedom .We are under siege every day by the autocrats and monarchists, from Moscow to Mar-A-Lago, and the decisions we make will be historic for the fate of our country and ou rfreedom . I am not writing to presume to tell you what to do, Mr. President, because that is up to you and Jill and your family entirely. You will be the best judge of that. 

But I am writing to remind you of who you are.As a truly great and magnificent leader, you belong to all of us. Sometimes it will be hard for you to perceive, much less fully comprehend , the substance and character of your own greatness. I write to remind you of your true greatness as a leader.***

***I want to leave you with a final thought about baseball, the American game where even the finest pitchers have only around 110 pitches in them before their armstire and begin to give out. In the eighth inning of the seventh game of the 2003 American League Championship Series against the New York Yankees, Pedro Martinez, one of the greatest pitchers in Red Sox history, began to tire badly after 118 pitches and he gave up three straight hits and a run from Derek Jeter. 

The Red Sox Manager, Grady Little, visited the mound and Martinez vigorously protested that he was fine and he could continue and give it his all despite all the statistics about what happens when pitchers play afterthrowing for so long. Little kept him in and the Yankees proceeded to tie the game at the next at-bat with a two-run single and then went on to win the game with an 11th inning home run by Aaron Boone. 

There is no shame in taking a well-deserved bow to the overflowing appreciation of the crowd when your arm is tired out, and there is real danger for the team in ignoring the statistics. Your situation is tricky because you are both our star pitcher and our Manager. But in democracy, as you have shown us more than any prior president, you are not a Manager acting all alone; you are the co-Manager along with our great team and our great people. 

Caucus with the team, Mr. President. Hear them out. You will make the right decision. 

With boundless admiration, affection and solidarity, 

Jamie Raskin (MD-8) 

Member, United States House of Representatives

"A horrific" Supreme Court Decision on Presidential Immunity | Congressman Jamie Raskin

Rep. Raskin's Statement on Supreme Court Decision on Presidential Immunity | Press Releases | Congressman Jamie Raskin

 

“Today, July 1. 2024 [in Trump v. United States] the Supreme Court took a bulldozer to the democratic credo that no one—including presidents and former presidents—is above the law.  Three years ago, after Donald Trump’s second impeachment trial, Mitch McConnell explained, ‘We have a criminal justice system in this country…  And former Presidents are not immune from being held accountable.’  But today, far-right justices embedded with the ‘Stop the Steal’ movement conferred broad immunity on Donald Trump, even going so far as to help him keep evidence of his criminal actions from coming to light in a court of law. 

 

Today’s ruling, postponing any prosecution of Trump until after the election and holding that Presidents are presumptively immune from criminal prosecution for using their office to assassinate political rivals, organize a military coup, or take bribes, is a radical break from the rule of law which underscores how much our democratic values have been eroded and are on the line in November.  Donald Trump has made it clear that, if he wins election, he will use his presidential powers to pardon all his co-conspirators and weaponize the Justice Department by firing career employees and replacing them with an army of sycophants willing to engage in retributive harassment against his political opponents.  All of this would be presumably allowable under today’s horrific decision.”

Three Flaws in the Supreme Court’s Decision on Presidential Criminal Immunity - Andrew Weissman Just Security

Three Flaws in the Supreme Court’s Decision on Presidential Criminal Immunity

on Presidential Criminal Immunity

 by Andrew Weissmann (Lead prosecutor - Mueller investigation)

July 17, 2024

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The Supreme Court’s presidential criminal immunity decision in Trump v. United States  suffers from shallow reasoning, lack of historical support, and distortion of legal precedent. This piece addresses three major flaws in the decision. All three derive from the Court’s failure to examine and differentiate the source and scope of presidential power — whether constitutionally or congressionally derived and, where the former, whether exclusively committed to the president or not. The three flaws are: the majority’s reliance on separation of powers to justify finding criminal immunity for all official presidential action (even outside the areas of exclusive presidential authority) despite its absence from the text or history of the constitution, its seeming preclusion of reliance on the criminal law to differentiate official from unofficial presidential conduct (again even outside of areas of exclusive presidential authority), and its similar preclusion of the president’s motives in making the determination as to whether conduct is official or not. 

Chief Justice John Roberts penned the majority opinion, which created (at the very least) a strong presumption of immunity for any official act taken by the president. It also precludes using evidence of such acts in a criminal case against the president, even one for private conduct – say, for example, paying hush money to a porn star to mislead the voting public in advance of the 2016 presidential election. 

Supreme Incompetence ~ Ian Millhiser. Vox

https://www.vox.com/scotus/359206/supreme-court-incompetent-abortion-trump-immunity

Alexander Hamilton: President subject to prosecution, contra John Roberts

  Federalist 69, authored by Alexander Hamilton, certainly the Constitution architect and author most friendly to executive power.

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.

Contra John Roberts in Trump v. USA 

Chevron By Another Name - by Adrian Vermeule

n  Equity’s existence partly is and partly is not intended by the legislators; not intended where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended where they find themselves unable to define things exactly, and are obligated to legislate as if that held good always  which in fact only holds good usually.

n  Aristotle: Rhetoric 

Adrian Vermeule- plain spoken as usual - sees C.J.John Roberts opinion for the Court reversing Chevron v. NRDC in Loper Bright v. Raimondo - as one which substitutes  "Loper Delegation" as largely consistent with the hands off agency applications of statutory authority in administrative law cases.

In essence, he argues that "Loper delegation" demands less of judges than some fear.  It will, in the main, lead to deference to reasonable agency applications of imprecisely or broadly stated legislative grants of authority to federal agency administrators.

Unlike some on the religious right, Vermeule is a defender of the so-called administrative state.  With Cass Sunstein - in their book Law and Leviathan - Redeeming the Administrative State - his defense is grounded in a Lon Fuller type approach to law's internal morality.  The Yale Journal on Regulations hosted a symposium on the Sunstein/Vermeule book.

Chevron By Any Other Name - by Adrian Vermeule

Please, everyone, take a deep breath. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo has now overruled the Chevron decision on deference to agencies, there is much less to Loper Bright than meets the eye. Overheated praise and overheated condemnation of the decision both miss the mark. It is entirely possible that much or most of what was (somewhat misleadingly) called “Chevron deference” can be and will be recreated under a different label: “Loper Bright delegation.” Indeed, the Court has already recreated it under that label, in the Loper Bright opinion itself.

Let me begin with Henry Monaghan, a brilliant scholar of public law from Columbia University, and an article he wrote in 1983 titled “Marbury and the Administrative State.” Monaghan’s central point was that there was no logical inconsistency between saying two different things: (1) the constitutional power and duty of judges to say what the law is, and the Administrative Procedure Act’s instruction to courts to decide all relevant questions of law,1 require judges to decide all legal questions independently; (2) agencies rather than courts may have the authority to fill in the details of statutory gaps or ambiguities. The reason those two things are consistent is simple. When judges identify the “best reading” of the statute, that best reading might itself just be that an explicit or implicit congressional delegation of such authority to the agency has occurred. Justice Kagan has underscored this point a number of times.

What are the logical consequences of Monaghan’s view? In a paper for an excellent recent symposium on Chevron deference in the George Mason Law Review, I explained that, on Monaghan’s logic, Chevron could be “overruled” in name, but then immediately reinstated under a different label — the label of delegation. That reinstatement could even occur in the very same decision that “overruled” Chevron. If I may be forgiven a self-quotation:

“[On this possibility,] deference will be reframed but not eliminated. The overruling majority will say—along lines indicated by Professor Henry Monaghan decades ago—that de novo or plenary judicial review of agency legal interpretations is required by legal sources (either by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), by Article III, or both). Yet the Court will also say that de novo interpretation might of course itself yield the conclusion that, in a given statute, Congress has delegated primary responsibility to agencies to fill in statutory gaps or ambiguities, subject to judicial review to ensure that agencies have remained within the scope of the delegation and chosen policy on reasonable grounds. This second possibility—call it retail Chevron rather than wholesale Chevron—will offer the Justices skeptical of Chevron an attractive resolution of the[ir] dilemma; it will allow the majority not only to overrule Chevron but, even more importantly, to be seen to overrule Chevron, while also largely preserving Chevron’s major source of appeal to judges—a way to avoid having to actually do fully independent interpretation of statutory terms that are vague, technical, or both.”

That is what has now occurred, almost exactly. ***

Rudy Giuliano disbarred: Matter of Giuliani (2021-00506).pdf

Matter of Giuliani (2021-00506).pdf

 

Supreme Court of the State of New York Appellate Division, First Judicial Department Dianne T. Renwick, P.J., Sallie Manzanet-Daniels Troy K. Webber Cynthia S. Kern Anil C. Singh, JJ. Motion Nos. 2024-01332 2024-02063 Case No. 2021-00506 In the Matter of RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI (ADMITTED AS RUDOLPH WILLIAM GIULIANI

**All concur. 

Wherefore, it is Ordered that the motion by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department to confirm the Referee’s report and recommendation pursuant to 603.8-a(t)(4) and 22 NYCRR 1240.8(b)(2) is granted, and respondent Rudolph W. Giuliani, admitted as Rudolph William Giuliani, is disbarred from the practice of law, effective immediately, and until the further order of this Court, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York;

Trump v.United States of America - Opinions

 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf

E.J. Dionne | How Biden can undo his debate performance damage - The Washington Post

I too was shocked by Biden''s weakness in the debate with Trump.   Biden's voice was thin, his remarks reasonably good but overwhelmed by Trump's strong voice and relentless lies and blustering.  But remember that those are the techniques by which Trump in 2016 blew away even the powerful, bloviating bully Chris Christie.
E.J. Dionne is a welcome commenter.- GWC
Opinion | How Biden can undo his debate performance damage - The Washington Post
***A CBS poll released Sunday was not encouraging for Biden. It found that the proportion of registered voters saying Biden did not have the mental and cognitive health to serve as president rose from 65 percent in early June to 72 percent after the debate.
If he does, he owes those who support him a clear strategy for undoing Thursday’s damage. He needs to do a series of televised interviews, including many in less than friendly settings. He’ll have to step up his campaign appearances, offering more speeches along the lines of his energetic performance in North Carolina on Friday.