Monday, April 8, 2024

History, Tradition, and the Designated Hitter Rule - Eric Segall // Dorf on Law

History, Tradition, and the Designated Hitter Rule // 
By Eric Segall

****Professor Solum, along with Professor Randy Barnett, has also commented on the role of history and tradition in some of the Court's recent cases. These two well-known academic originalists wrote an article titled "Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: The Role of History and Tradition." 

Their article begins by saying that "in three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court." Not surprisingly, these two originalists concluded the following about history and tradition (the article is sophisticated and provocative but is not the direct subject of this post, hence the leap to the conclusion):

In this Article, we have argued for an originalist approach to history and tradition. History and tradition are essential elements in the originalist toolkit: no originalist should leave home without them. But originalists should be wary of the use of history and tradition by non-originalists, whether they be Progressive or Conservative Constitutional Pluralists. An originalist embrace of history and tradition that is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the constitutional text would undermine originalism itself and sacrifice the rule of law, the separation of powers, and popular sovereignty on the altar of pragmatism and political expediency. Our message is simple: “Originalists, don’t go there!”

Not only should originalists not go there (a strong version of traditionalism) but no one else should either because a tradition-focused approach to constitutional interpretation provides little guidance to judges and lets them hide their implicit value judgments and ideologies behind centuries of disputed practices, customs, and traditions (or the absence thereof). How long does something have to last to be a tradition? How widespread does the tradition have to be? Is rejection of  practices something judges should take strong notice of when examining the role of history and tradition? What if a long tradition is viewed as pernicious by large segments of minority populations? There are no good answers to any of these questions.

Here is a hypothetical to demonstrate these problems....

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