11th Circuit vacates Trump Mar a Lago Special master

The United States District Courts are courts of limited, not general  jurisdiction. When as a lawyer you find yourself writing that the judge should assert "anomalous jurisdiction" it is time to stop writing.  But like many around Donald Trump, his lawyers come to feel that normal doesn't matter.  Sometimes they are right.  Not today. Not even with the conservative Chief Judge William Pryor on the bench.

- GWC

 Donald J. Trump v. United States of America

***The FBI executed the search warrant on August 8. Agents seized approximately 13,000 documents and a number of other items, totaling more than 22,000 pages of material. Despite the certification from Plaintiff that “[a]ny and all” documents bearing classification markings had been produced, fifteen of the thirtythree seized boxes, containers, or groups of papers contained documents with classification markings, including three such documents found in desks in Plaintiff’s office. All told, the search uncovered over one hundred documents marked confidential, secret, or top secret.

**

Plaintiff requested a copy of the warrant affidavit, an opportunity to inspect the seized property, a detailed list of what was taken from the residence and where it was found, and consent to the appointment of a special master “to protect the integrity of privileged documents.” The government denied those requests shortly after the search. A few weeks later, Plaintiff filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which he styled as a “Motion For Judicial Oversight And Additional Relief.” 

The motion asked the court to (1) appoint a special master; (2) enjoin review of the seized materials until a special master was appointed; (3) require the United States to supply a more detailed list of the items seized; and (4) order the United States to return any item seized that was not within the scope of the search warrant. 

The motion was a civil filing and did not explain how the district court had jurisdiction to act on all of its requests. It did, however, claim to be a precursor to an eventual motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). That rule permits a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property” to “move for the property’s return.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). The district court could not identify a sufficient jurisdictional basis for the filing, so it requested a jurisdictional brief. Days later, Plaintiff responded that the district court had “equitable and ancillary jurisdiction,” as well as “anomalous jurisdiction,” to enjoin the government and appoint a special master.

***

The law is clear. We cannot write a rule that allows any subject of a search warrant to block government investigations after the execution of the warrant. Nor can we write a rule that allows only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be a radical reordering of our caselaw limiting the federal courts’ involvement in criminal investigations. And both would violate bedrock separation-of-powers limitations. Accordingly, we agree with the government that the district court improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction, and that dismissal of the entire proceeding is required. 

 The district court improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction in this case. For that reason, we VACATE the September 5 order on appeal and REMAND with instructions for the district court to DISMISS the underlying civil action.