Friday, March 29, 2024

Enforcement Act 1866 - draftw

 

“The tenant agrees not to permit the premises to be used or occupied by any person other than members of the Caucasian race, but the employment and maintenance of other than Caucasian domestic servants shall be permitted.” —Levittown Corporation Lease (1948)

 

The same language was incorporated into the deeds of the 17,000 houses built by the Levitt family in Levittown and abutting East Meadow.
Those homes - $7,000 when my parents - both Navy vets bought via a VA insured, zero points mortgage - sold forty years later for ten times that.
Only Caucasians gained such equity.  Levitt - who was Jewish - thought Jews and Christians should not mix, but deemed Jews to be honorary Caucasians.
Anyone of African descent - slave, freeman, or immigrant - was barred from purchase or residency.
The Enforcement Act of 1866 was a broad prohibition of ethnic discrimination.  It provided, in relevant part:
>
> citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.


  Passed under the 13th Amendment, it was a dead letter until Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. in 1965.  It survives in substantial part as 42 USC 1982.

The 14th Amendment was designed to bind the reconstructed states to the same principles.  But in 1875 Joseph Bradley, a New Jersey railroad lawyer elevated to the Supreme Court, sitting as a Circuit judge overturned the murder convictions of a dozen men who as part of a white militia murdered 120 African American men defending the Colfax, Louisiana Courthouse.  The convictions were set aside on the grounds that such crimes committed by private persons were beyond the reach of the 14th Amendment.  Thus was born the state action doctrine.

That was quite a surprise because Bradley had in 1871 personally advised then District Judge Samuel Miller (later an Associate Justice) that:
>>
>> the XIVth amendment not only prohibits the making or enforcing of  laws which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen; but prohibits the states > from denying to all persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of > the laws. Denying includes inaction as well as action. And denying the > equal protection of the laws includes the omission to protect, as well as  the omission to pass laws for protection.

But when the Cruikshank cases got to the full Supreme Court the state action  requirement was embraced. Convictions were reversed on the ground that the
United States' jurisdiction did not extend to such local crimes.    See James Gray Pope - Snubbed Landmark.   

Not until the Emmett Till Act, passed two years ago did the national government have explicit authority to punish racially or otherwise discriminatorily motivated crimes of violence.  But even there the government must prove some interstate element such as crossing state lines.

So where are we now?  Clarence Thomas, in Missouri v. Jenkins  finds that  "a]s with any inherent judicial power, however, we ought to be reluctant to approve its aggressive or extravagant use, and instead we should exercise it in a manner consistent with our history and traditions."    He renounces " extravagant uses of judicial power that] are at odds with the history and tradition of the equity power and the Framers' design. The available historical records suggest that the Framers did not intend federal equitable remedies to reach as broadly as we have permitted."

So as Jim pointed out  the statute of limitations is short.  But the Court's memory is long - as the majority binds itself to the inventions of the founding generation which accommodated itself to the
system of chattel slavery.  Must we do the same?

Eastman disciplinary case probably not going to the California Supreme Court just yet

John Eastman is a former Dean of Chapman University School of Law, one time clerk for Associate Justice Clarence Thomas.  An architect, with Kenneth Chesebro  of the Trump legal efforts to block Joe Biden from assuming the office of President, Eastman faces disbarment in California and jail in the legal efforts to prevent Vice President Mike Pence from counting the Electoral Votes on January 6, 2020.
@legalnerd, a former federal and state prosecutor, tipped me of to this blog by a California appellate law firm. - GWC
Eastman disciplinary case probably not going to the California Supreme Court just yet
At The Lectern - Horvitz and Levy , LLP

A California State Bar Court judge yesterday issued a 128-page decision recommending that John Eastman, one of former President Trump’s lawyers, be disbarred for “transgress[ing] . . . ethical limits by advocating, participating in and pursuing a strategy to challenge the results of the 2020 presidential election that lacked evidentiary or legal support.”

Many media reports suggest that the next stop for the disciplinary proceeding is the California Supreme Court. (See, e.g., the Associated Press: yesterday’s recommendation “now goes to the California Supreme Court for a final ruling on whether he should be disbarred.”) But the court is not necessarily next, or last for that matter.

The disbarment recommendation will probably first go to the State Bar Court’s Review Department, which “must independently review the record and may adopt findings, conclusions, and a decision or recommendation different from those of the hearing judge.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12.) A petition for review in the Supreme Court “must show that review within the State Bar Court has been exhausted.” (Rule 9.13(e)(1).)

In the unlikely event Eastman himself doesn’t ask for further review, the matter would end up in the Supreme Court anyway. All recommendations for disbarment automatically go to the court, which can choose what to do regardless of what Eastman does.

As with any case other than a death penalty appeal, the Supreme Court can deny review. (Rule 9.16(b).) Unlike other cases, however, a denial “is a final judicial determination on the merits” and is followed by the filing of the State Bar Court’s recommendation “as an order of the Supreme Court.” (Ibid.)

Whatever the state Supreme Court might do, seeking review in the U.S. Supreme Court is an option. For example, if Eastman is unsuccessful in the Review Department and the California Supreme Court, he will likely seek certiorari in the high court, continuing to assert that disciplining him violates his First Amendment rights.

Under the State Bar’s rules of procedure, Eastman has 30 days from yesterday’s decision to ask the State Bar Court’s Review Department to hear his case or, if he first moves for reconsideration, he will have 30 days after a ruling on the motion by the State Bar Court judge. (Rules of Procedure, rules 5.115, 5.151.)

Thursday, March 28, 2024

How China’s Supreme People’s Court Supports the Development of Foreign-Related Rule of Law by Susan Finder :: SSRN

How China’s Supreme People’s Court Supports the Development of Foreign-Related Rule of Law by Susan Finder :: SSRN

Susan Finder

Peking University School of Transnational Law; University of Hong Kong

Date Written: February 19, 2024

Abstract

This article provides a detailed analysis of the evolution of the role of the Supreme People’s Court (spc) in the Xi Jinping era, examining functions little explored in scholarship. It explains how and why the spc supports national strategies, focusing on the development of “foreign-related rule of law” through multiple “active” functions. It explores that work in the context of strengthened Communist Party leadership of the courts and other legal institutions. The article examines the spc’s functions of “policy-making,” “law-making,” case hearing, and coordinating and cooperating with central Party and state institutions and how they are used to support the development of “foreign-related rule of law.” The discussion of those functions also illustrates the impact of strengthened Communist Party leadership. The Politburo’s 2023 collective study session on foreign-related rule of law signals that the spc’s foreign-related judicial expertise as exercised through its multiple functions is crucially important to the Party leadership. The article illustrates one aspect of the unique role of the spc as China’s highest court in its dynamic political-legal system and the way in which it supports evolving national strategies and the implementation of fundamental policies.

Finder, Susan, How China’s Supreme People’s Court Supports the Development of Foreign-Related Rule of Law (February 19, 2024). Peking University School of Transnational Law Research Paper Forthcoming, China Law and Society Review 8 (2023) 62–118, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4753201

California Bar Judge John Eastman -former Trump lawyer - Decision - Trial - DocumentCloud



California is the only state with an independent professional Court dedicated to ruling on attorney discipline cases.

The State Bar Court hears charges filed by the State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel against attorneys whose actions allegedly involve misconduct.

The State Bar Court has the authority to recommend that the California Supreme Court suspend or disbar attorneys found to have committed acts of professional misconduct or to have been convicted of serious crimes.

For lesser offenses, the State Bar Court can issue public or private reprovals.

SBC-23-O-30029 - Decision - Trial - DocumentCloud

In view of the circumstances surrounding Eastman’s misconduct and balancing the aggravation and mitigation, the court recommends that Eastman be disbarred.

Monday, March 25, 2024

A Deep Dive into the History of Israel and Palestine – Center for Jewish Studies @Fordham







As the son of a Fordham College grad - Class of 1942, and as one who has taught  at Fordham for over twenty years I take pride in the school.  I am proud to be moderator of the Colloquium on Catholicism and Contemporary Problems, sponsored by the Institute on Religion, Law, and Lawyers Work..

But my pride at the moment is stirred by this impressive series, hosted by Fordham historian and Director of the Fordham Center for Jewish Studies - Magda Teter.  She is the author most recently of the impressive and nuanced Christian Supremacy, Reckoning with the Roots of Antisemitism and Racism.

The ethic of understanding and sympathy for the actors and victims of tragedy also characterizes these four dialogs by Dr. Hussein Ibish (Arab Gulf States Institute) and Dr. David Myers (UCLA), all osted by Professor Teter.

A Deep Dive into the History of Israel and Palestine – Center for Jewish Studies @Fordham

The Hamas-engineered massacre of October 7, 2023 stunned and shocked Israel and the Jewish world to the core. It triggered a massive Israeli response that has reduced large parts of northern Gaza to rubble. Supporters of Israel and the Palestinians are more bitterly divided than ever, around the world and especially on college campuses. What are the roots of today’s conflict? And what does it portend for the future of the region?  

To gain insight into this latest stage in a brutal and divisive conflict that has ebbed and flowed for over a century, Fordham University’s Center for Jewish Studies is sponsoring a four-part series on the history of the conflict with Dr. Hussein Ibish and Prof. David Myers. 


Saturday, March 23, 2024

Supreme Court: Three women will argue Mifepristone case / Bloomberg

NEXT WEEK’S Supreme Court arguments over the availability of the abortion drug mifepristone—one of the term’s most closely watched cases—will feature a rarity: All three advocates who will appear at the lectern on Tuesday are women, Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson reports.

  • US Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar will defend Food and Drug Administration actions in 2016 and 2021 that removed certain restrictions on prescribing and dispensing the drug. Hogan Lovells partner Jessica Ellsworth will represent mifepristone brand-name manufacturer Danco Laboratories. And Erin Hawley, a lawyer for the Christian legal group Alliance Defending Freedom, will argue on behalf of a group of anti-abortion doctors who contend the agency’s actions were unlawful and put patients in danger.
  • The number of women arguing cases at the high court has fluctuated between 12% and 24% in recent terms, but that figure is closer to a third in this term. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine will feature the term’s fourth all-women lineup. Some female appellate lawyers said that was an encouraging sign, but not exactly cause for celebration: Male-only lineups this term have occurred nearly four times more often. 

Friday, March 22, 2024

LegalMente AI - are we going to be replaced by bots??

Lawyers are expensive. Our AI reviews legal contracts for FREE. Trained on expert legal minds. Free BAA Review. Free NDA Review. Free AI Chatbot to ask questions about your legal doc. Sign up now. Start cutting legal costs: app.legalmente.ai/signup Note: Info not legal advice

Wednesday, March 20, 2024

Opinion 745 -New Jersey Ethics Committee bars referral fees to out of state lawyers

 


The New Jersey Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics has faced a recurring question: may a New Jersey Certified Trial Attorney pay a referral fee to an out of state lawyer? Opinion 745 answers the question.  Mostly in the negative.

Bounded by New York and Pennsylvania, with many citizens andy members of the State Bar part-time residents of Florida, the question arises frequently..

 The Rules of Professional Conduct generally  New Jersey lawyers from paying referral fees. RPC 7.2(c) (lawyers shall not “give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services”) and RPC 7.3(d) (lawyers “shall not compensate or give anything of value” to a person for recommending the lawyer’s employment by a client or “as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer’s employment by a client”). Referral fees are a division of the legal fee not reflective of work participation.

But the state's 35 year old system of certification of specialists has from the first treated Certified Trial Attorneys differently.  New Jersey lawyers who are certified trial lawyers under Court Rule 1:39-1 through 1:39-9 may pay a referral fee.  Certification is achieved by demonstration of substantial trial experience, peer recognition, and passage of a written test on the Rules of Evidence.  Certified trial lawyers may and do advertise their readiness to pay referral fees regardless of work participation, and without the referring attorney assuming joint professional liability.

Under New Jersey's Rules of Court published Opinions of the seventeen member ACPE bind members of the bar.  But any lawyer and any bar association may petition the Supreme Court for review.

- GWC

OPINION 745 Referral Fees 

The Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics and the attorney ethics research assistance hotline have received inquiries about out-of-state lawyers seeking payment of referral fees from New Jersey certified attorneys. Some states, such as Florida, host seasonal New Jersey residents who present local lawyers with legal issues that involve New Jersey law; out-of-state lawyers in our neighboring states may also have local clients with New Jersey matters. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, certified lawyers generally may not pay referral fees to out of-state lawyers. 

Certified lawyers also may not pay referral fees to New Jersey lawyers who cannot accept a case, or must withdraw from a case, due to a conflict of interest. Certified lawyers may, however, pay referral fees to New Jersey lawyers who referred a case when they were eligible to practice but were thereafter suspended or disbarred when the case resolved and the referral fee was payable.

****** 

Opinion 745 concludes:

In sum, certified lawyers may not pay referral fees to out-of-state lawyers unless those out-of-state lawyers are licensed and eligible to practice law in New Jersey. In addition, certified lawyers may not pay referral fees to a lawyer who 6 cannot handle a matter due to a conflict of interest, though they may pay referral fees to lawyers who referred a case when they were eligible to practice but were suspended or disbarred at the time the case resolved and the referral fee was payable. 

Tuesday, March 19, 2024

Scotus allows Texas to continue to patrol international border with Mexico

Texas border security


This:

23A814 United States v. Texas (03/19/2024)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23A814 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS, ET AL. ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY No. 23A815 LAS AMERICAS IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER, ET AL. v. STEVEN MCCRAW, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL. ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY [March 19, 2024] The applications to vacate stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO and by him referred to the Court are denied. The orders heretofore entered by JUSTICE ALITO are vacated. JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins, concurring in denial of applications to vacate stay. If the Fifth Circuit had issued a stay pending appeal, this Court would apply the four-factor test set forth in Nken v. Holder—including, as relevant in this Court, an assessment of certworthiness—to decide whether to vacate it. 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009); Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief ). But the Fifth Circuit has not entered a stay pending appeal. Instead, in an exercise of its docket management authority, it issued a temporary administrative stay and deferred the stay motion to a merits panel, which is considering it in conjunction with Texas’s challenge to the District Court’s injunction of S. B. 4.
****** 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins, dissenting from denial of applications to vacate stay. Today, the Court invites further chaos and crisis in immigration enforcement. Texas passed a law that directly regulates the entry and removal of noncitizens and explicitly instructs its state courts to disregard any ongoing federal immigration proceedings. That law upends the federal state balance of power that has existed for over a century, in which the National Government has had exclusive authority over entry and removal of noncitizens. The District Court here declared that Texas’s law amounts to “nullification of federal law and authority—a notion that is antithetical to the Constitution and has been unequivocally rejected by the federal courts since the Civil War.” 2024 WL 861526, *1 (WD Tex., Feb. 29, 2024). 

Monday, March 18, 2024

Supreme Court tries to stem `judge shopping'

 


Every lawyer who has a choice tries to find a favorable venue - usually because the ethnic makeup of the potential jury venire matches the intended appeal of the plaintiff.  But sometimes judge-shopping looks like the best bet.  Sometimes that is an entire Circuit (think 5th now but not in the 1960's).

But recently in the Mifepristone case now before the Supreme Court the right wing plaintiffs of the so-called Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine rang the bell   with a single judge U.S. District Court venue.  Judge Matthew Kaczmaryk, a dedicated anti-abortion activist, is the only one in the Northern District of Texas courthouse.

But now in what Dahlia Lithwick and Mark Joseph Stern call a victory against "rogue" judges the Supreme Court, via the 26 member Judicial Conference of the United States has issued a Guidance for Civil Case Assignments in District Courts to require the random assignment of judges.

The Fani Willis disqualification ruling: Creating an Appearance of Impropriety by Purporting to Dispel One

 The Atlanta Georgia D.A. Fani Willis disqualification ruling
 Creating an Appearance of Impropriety by Purporting to Dispel One - Dorf on Law
 

The key point in Judge McAfee's ruling on the motion to disqualify Fani Willis and Nathan Wade from the Georgia state court case against Donald Trump and his co-defendants is that the defendants were not in any way prejudiced by Willis's romantic relationship with Wade. I'm glad Judge McAfee reached that conclusion, but he nonetheless deserves fairly withering criticism on at least two grounds.

First, in light of his reasoning, Judge McAfee should not have held the distracting and time-wasting evidentiary hearing at all. Second, his conclusion that the Willis/Wade relationship created the appearance of impropriety was a non sequitur in light of his principal conclusion. Worse, that very conclusion itself creates a substantially greater appearance of impropriety than anything that Willis or Wade did.

Let's begin with a brief synopsis. Everyone paying the slightest bit of attention understands that the real motive for the defendants' motion to disqualify Willis and Wade was to derail the prosecution. The ostensible legal argument, however, alleged a conflict of interest. Willis hired Wade as a Special Assistant District Attorney, the allegations go, in order that Wade could get paid by the state, and he in turn would use the money he received to pay for vacation travel for himself and Willis; that alleged fact in turn gave Willis a financial stake in Wade continuing in his role, which in turn gave her a financial stake in the prosecution continuing. But a prosecutor ought to decide whether to keep a case going against defendants based on the law and facts, not a financial stake in the case. Thus, the argument concluded, so long as Wade was on the payroll and her boyfriend, Willis had an improper financial incentive.

Those allegations could in theory establish an improper financial incentive. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et fils (1987), SCOTUS held that it was improper to appoint an interested opposing party in ongoing civil litigation as the prosecutor of a criminal contempt arising out of that matter. To be sure, there the conflict was not simply financial, but one can certainly imagine that even a purely financial incentive would distort prosecutorial judgment. And Georgia is entitled to have stricter conflict-avoidance rules than the federal courts or various other states.

But that's all in theory. What about in fact?

As Judge McAfee acknowledges, "[w]henever a private attorney -- like Wade -- is paid by the billable hour, a motive exists to extend or prolong the assignment." Judge McAfee quickly dismisses that "tension" as one "that the legal profession has long accepted." If that's so, however, then it's hard to see how any of the defendants' allegations could have arisen to the level of a disqualifying interest.

The defendants claim that Wade shared the money he received for his services with Willis by paying her portion of vacation expenses along with his. Willis pushed back hard, claiming she reimbursed Willis in cash. Even if that's not true, however, Willis would have received at most the same financial benefit as Wade could (if we assume that Wade would have paid for his portion of the vacation expenses out of separate funds and used all of what he received as a Special ADA to subsidize Willis). But if the size of the financial incentive Wade received was tolerable--indeed, "long accepted"--it's hard to see why shifting that incentive from one prosecutor (Wade) to another (Willis) creates a problematic conflict of interest.

Moreover, any financial incentive Wade and/or Willis had to prolong Wade's work on the case actually works to the benefit of the defendants because prolonging--i.e., dragging out and delaying--the case is exactly what they want. The closer the trial moves to the November election, the easier it becomes for Trump and all of his co-defendants to find at least one juror to resist voting to convict on the ground that the case is politically motivated.

In any event, as Judge McAfee acknowledges in his opinion, no improper incentive Willis had to drag the case out to funnel money to Wade influenced Willis. It's worth quoting Judge McAfee nearly in full (minus citations) on this point:

Defendants argue that the financial arrangement created an incentive to prolong the case, but in fact, there is no indication the District Attorney is interested in delaying anything. Indeed, the record is quite to the contrary. Before the relationship came to light, the State requested that trial begin less than six months after indictment. Soon thereafter, the State opposed severance of the objecting defendants who did not demand their statutory right to a speedy trial. . . . The State amended its proposed timeline in November 2023 to request that the trial commence less than one year after the return of the indictment. And even before indictment, the District Attorney approved a Grand Jury presentment that included fewer defendants than the Special Purpose Grand Jury recommended. In sum, the District Attorney has not in any way acted in conformance with the theory that she arranged a financial scheme to enrich herself (or endear herself to Wade) by extending the duration of this prosecution or engaging in excessive litigation.

Crucially, every indication that Willis was unaffected by any financial incentive running through Wade identified in that extremely persuasive paragraph was known before and without holding an evidentiary hearing. Thus, Judge McAfee's reasoning demonstrates that there was no reason to hold the evidentiary hearing. He could and should have simply denied the defendant's motions on the ground that there was no prejudice to them from anything they alleged (and indeed that their allegations, if true, would benefit them) while referring their allegations to the Georgia bar to investigate any impropriety.

Given the absence of any prejudicial conflict, why did Judge McAfee require either Willis or Wade to leave the case in order for it to proceed? He found an appearance of impropriety largely based on the dubious testimony of various witnesses about when Wade and Willis started dating. Here is how he put the point: "neither side was able to conclusively establish by a preponderance of the evidence when the relationship evolved into a romantic one. However, an odor of mendacity remains."

Okay, so Wade, Willis, and/or other witnesses may have lied under oath. If so, that's bad and another item for possible referral to the Georgia bar. But it has nothing to do with anything that could possibly prejudice the defendants.

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